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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
THE ROBERT ALTON HARRIS DECISION:l 
FEDERALISM, COMITY, AND JUDICIAL 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Tuesday, April 21, 1992, Robert Alton Harris became 
the first person to be executed in California in over 25 years.2 It 
was perhaps predictable, therefore, that his execution was pre-
ceded by a flurry of legal activity.3 Last minute lawsuits pre-
empted a holiday weekend and extended into the early hours of 
the morning up until just 20 minutes before his 6:21 a.m. execu-
tion," The bulk of Harris' legal maneuvers encompassed a total 
of 16 habeas appeals over a 14 year period. II 
This article touches on only three of the many issues raised 
by the Harris case.6 First, it explores the appropriateness of 
1. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 790 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal.) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting in 966 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.», vacated as moot, 966 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1992). The 
entire procedural history of Gomez and all related cases is attached as an Appendix. 
2. Aaron Mitchell was executed in 1967 for killing a Sacramento police officer. See 
David G. Savage & Dan Morain, Ruling Paves Way for 1st Execution Since '67, LA 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1990, at AI. 
3. A total of six lawsuits were filed in the week preceding his execution, three of 
them after 12 midnight on April 20, the time originally slated for Harris' execution. See 
Appendix, pp. 209-12. 
4. See Appendix, pp. 209-12. If Harris' execution had not been carried out within 24 
hours of the time denoted on the execution warrant (April 21 at 12:01 a.m.), the warrant 
would have expired. It would then have been necessary to cancel his execution and 
reschedule it, a process that would have taken anywhere from 30 to 60 days pursuant to 
California law. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1227 (1992). 
5. There were six federal habeas petitions and ten state habeas petitions. See gener-
ally Appendix. 
6. For a discussion of other primary and collateral issues concerning the Robert Al-
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Harris' section 1983 class action7 filed on behalf of all California 
death row inmates.8 Specifically, Harris argued that death by le-
thal gas9 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1o 
The Supreme Court characterized the section 1983 action as an 
attempt to avoid the application of McCleskey u. Zant,ll which 
bars successive claims for relief.12 By way of an extensive histori-
tive on Capital Punishment, 40 UCLA L. REV. 339 (1992) (written by the father of one 
of the victims, a Detective with the San Diego Police Department, who was one of Har-
ris' arresting officers, and who advocates stiffer sentencing as one avenue to strengthen 
the rights of crime victims); Janice Rogers Brown, The Quality of Mercy, 40 UCLA L. 
REV. 327 (1992) (written by Governor Pete Wilson's Legal Affairs Secretary, who asserts 
the clemency process should not be burdened with procedural trappings or artificial con-
straints imposed by the courts, but rather should retain its character as an exercise of 
common sense and compassion); Stephen G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hier-
archy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255 (1992) (Northwestern law 
professors analyze the Supreme Court's actions in the Harris case and evaluate the ap-
propriate role of the Supreme Court in reviewing decisions by inferior courts to grant or 
deny equitable relief); Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of 
Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992) (constitutional scholars point out some of 
the problems posed by the Harris decision, including criticism of the Ninth Circuit's 
order denying review of Harris' gas chamber claim, and of the Supreme Court's decisions 
vacating Harris' last-minute stays of execution); Daniel E. Lungren and Mark L. 
Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 
295 (1992) (California Attorney General and Special Assistant Attorney General discuss 
the need for habeas reform, the disadvantages of one-judge stays, and the functions of 
deterrence and innocence in habeas review); Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, 
The Death Penalty, and The Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992) (a Ninth Circuit 
judge condemns the United States Supreme Court for its role in Harris' execution, say-
ing the high court placed a higher premium on legal procedures than a man's life); Jef I. 
Richards and R. Bruce Easter, Televising Executions: The High-Tech Alternative to 
Public Hangings, 40 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1992) (an examination of the current prohibi-
tions on televised executions which weighs the arguments of those opposed to televised 
executions against the first amendment right of the press to gather information); Charles 
M. Sevilla & Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: The 
Death Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REV. 345 (1992) (co-counsel for 
Robert Alton Harris discuss the merits of the claim that death in the gas chamber is 
cruel and unusual punishment, as well as the merits of Harris' conviction and death 
sentence). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See infra note 61. 
8. Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
9. Penal Code Section 3604 spells out lethal gas as the state's only method of execu-
tion. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604 (1992). The state switched from death by hanging to lethal 
gas in 1937. Since capital punishment was reenacted in 1976, only six of 168 executed 
prisoners have been killed by lethal gas - four in Mississippi and one each in Nevada 
and Arizona, according to Harris' suit. Fierro v. Gomez, No. 92-1482-MHP (N.D. CaL). 
10. U.S. Const. amend. VIII (providing in pertinent part that "excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment 
inflicted"). 
11. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
12. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam). 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/15
1993] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 157 
cal analysis of each, this article examines the respective roles of 
section 1983 and habeas corpus in order to determine which was 
the appropriate vehicle for Harris' lawsuit. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court did not rest its decision to overrule Harris' stay 
upon McCleskey; rather, it applied an equitable standard to re-
view Harris' request for an injunction against execution by 
means of lethal gas.13 
This article also analyzes Harris' use of Teague v. Lane l • as 
both a sword and a shield, enabling him to simultaneously chal-
lenge retroactive application of the McCleskey standard to his 
case, while invoking the protection of an evolving standard for 
cruel and unusual punishment. II! 
Finally, this article examines the controversial decision by 
the Supreme Court to bar further stays "except upon order of 
this Court. "16 Although the Supreme Court's edict has come 
under fire from various constitutional scholars,!7 it has been 
praised by both scholars and practitioners alike. 18 Several justifi-
cations for the Supreme Court's action have been offered, in-
cluding the "inherent supervisory powers" of the Supreme 
Court,!9 the All Writs Act,20 and certain extraordinary circum-
stances which set the Harris case apart from earlier death pen-
13. Id. Justices Stevens and Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion asserting execution 
by the gas chamber does constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1653-56. 
14. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague held that, "[uJnless they fall within an exception to 
the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to 
those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." Id. at 301. 
15. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). The standard for decid-
ing what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not set by what the prevailing 
norm was in 1789, but rather by an evolving adaptation to new evils. Id. at 373. 
16. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (1992) (A-768). 
17. See generally Caminker & Chemerinsky, supra note 6; Reinhardt, supra note 6; 
Henry J. Reske, Courts Battle Over Harris Execution: An Impatient Supreme Court 
Orders an End to Last-Minute Stays by 9th Circuit, 78-Jul A.B.A.J. 26 (1992); Steve 
Baughman, High Court Went Too Far In Limiting Harris' Stay, THE RECORDER, Apr. 
24, 1992, at 7; Lisa Stansky, High Court's Power Debated in Harris Case, THE RE-
CORDER, July 28, 1992, at 1. 
18. See, e.g., Daniel E. Lungren, Esq., High Court Ruling was Both Justified and 
Necessary, CAL. STATE BAR BULL., Sept. 1992, at 1; G. Michael German, ACLU Should 
Pay for 'Abusive' Appeals, THE RECORDER, Apr. 24, 1992, at 7; Thomas Sowell, Talking 
Sense About the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at A-17; Robert Bork, An 
Outbreak of Judicial Civil Disobedience, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1992; Requiem for A Mur-
derer, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1992. 
19. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text. 
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988); see infra note 303. 
3
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. FACTS 
On July 5, 1978, Robert Alton Harris ("Harris") and his 
brother Daniel kidnapped two 16-year-old boys from a Jack-in-
the-Box parking lot in Mira Mesa, California.22 The brothers 
drove the boys' car to a deserted canyon.23 After assuring the 
boys they would not be hurt, Harris shot one.24 The other boy 
ran, screamed for help and tried to hide.21i Harris pursued and 
killed him as well, after ordering him to "[s]top crying and die 
like a man."26 Harris then got into the car and finished the boys' 
hamburgers.27 He and Daniel drove to Harris' girlfriend's home, 
where Harris "belittled his younger brother for not having the 
stomach to join him in eating the boys' lunches."28 Later that 
day, the Harris brothers robbed a bank.29 
Upon their arrest for the bank robbery just hours later, 
Daniel informed the officers of the murders and confessed.30 
Daniel placed the blame primarily on Harris.31 
After listening to portions of Daniel's statement, Harris con-
fessed. 32 He repeated his confession to a psychiatrist that eve-
21. See infra notes 326-36 and accompanying text. 
22. People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240, 244 (1981). Harris wanted the boys' car for a 
bank robbery. When they were kidnapped, the two boys (John Mayeski and Michael 
Baker) were sitting in a green Ford LTD eating hamburgers. Id.; see also Alan Abraham-
son, Harris' Execution Set for April 21, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at A24. 
23. Harris, 623 P.2d at 244. 
24.Id. 
25.Id. 
26. Id.; see also Requiem for A Murderer, supra note 9. 
27. Harris, 623 P.2d at 244. 
28. Id. This was according to Daniel Harris' testimony. See Savage & Morain, supra 
note 2, at AI. 
29. Harris, 623 P.2d at 244. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. "Daniel testified for the People in return for being permitted to plead guilty 
to one count of kidnapping." Id. at 243 n.2. Daniel's testimony was corroborated by a 
series of extrajudicial statements made by Harris. See infra notes 32-40 and accompany-
ing text. 
32. Harris, 623 P.2d at 244. Harris told Officer Fred Dreis: 
Danny thought I was going to let them go. He didn't know I 
was going to kill them. Danny was about 20 feet away sitting 
4
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ning.33 He subsequently confessed in detail to a criminal investi-
gator on July 7, 1978,34 and again one hour before he was 
arraigned that same day.31i Harris confessed again to his sister on 
July 15, 1978,36 and finally to a fellow inmate the following 
day.37 When asked why he had killed the boys, Harris answered, 
"I couldn't have no punks running around that could do that 
[identify him], so I wasted them."3S Although he denied the kill-
ings during the guilt phase of his bifurcated jury trial,39 Harris 
again confessed during the penalty phase of his trial in an at-
tempt to demonstrate remorse as a mitigating factor.4o 
down when I shot them. I shot one and he spun around. I then 
shot him in the head because I didn't want him to suffer. I 
chased the other and shot the other boy about three times. 
Danny was scared and he didn't shoot either of them. 
Id. at 250. 
33. Id. During an interview concerning the murders, Harris told psychiatrist Dr. 
WaIt Griswold he had shot the victims after assuring his brother they would not be hurt. 
Id. 
34. Id. Harris told Investigator Boulden, among other things, "that he shot John 
Mayeski in the chest and head with the pistol, then chased Michael Baker and upon 
catching him, shot the boy three or four times with the pistol, and, finally, went back to 
Mayeski and shot him with the rifle." Id. 
35. Id. at 244. Harris confessed in detail to Officer Ronald Newman. Id. at 250. It 
was the detailed character of this confession that was used by the People to impeach 
Harris' testimony at trial. At trial, Harris claimed: 
Id. 
that he had no part in kidnapping, robbing and murdering the 
two boys; that his brother was solely responsible for the 
crimes; that his confessions were attempts to cover up for his 
brother, and that he learned the details of the crimes from his 
brother while they were detained at the police station. 
36. Id. at 244. Harris told his sister Glenda, "Now, I guess because I killed those two 
boys, they were only 16 years old, then robbed the bank and kidnapped them was be-
cause I really wanted to die." Id. at 244-45. 
37. Id. at 245. Harris shared a holding cell with Joey Abshire on July 26, 1978. Har-
ris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1990). Abshire testified that Harris said that: 
him and his brother took two boys up in the hills and after 
they got up there [Harris] told them to get out; one of them 
got out and [Harris] shot him. And [Harris] went around the 
other side and the other kid was crying and telling [Harris] 
not to shoot him and [Harris] shot him anyway. 
Id. 
38. Vasquez, 943 F.2d at 936-37. Sergeant Charles Shramek of the San Diego 
County Marshal's Office monitored Harris' conversation with Joey Abshire. Id. at 937. 
39. Harris, 623 P.2d at 245. Harris "admitted the bank robbery but denied kidnap-
ping, robbing and murdering the two boys. He explained his pretrial confessions as at-
tempts to protect his brother." Id. 
40. Id. at 246. Harris confessed that he had, indeed, killed the boys. Id.; see also 
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B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In March 1992, after his case had received 11 separate re-
views,41 Harris's execution was set for 12:01 a.m. on April 21,,2 
But on April 17, Harris filed three new lawsuits: 1) his ninth 
state habeas petition, 2) his fourth federal habeas petition, and 
3) a federal class action claiming that execution by \ lethal gas 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.48 
On April 20, 1992, the Ninth Circuit unanimously denied 
Harris' federal habeas petition,,4 In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
vacated a temporary restraining order ("TRO") that had been 
issued by United States District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel 
on the cruel and unusual punishment question.'11 
At 6:30 p.m. that same day, a single Ninth Circuit judge46 
issued the first order staying Harris' execution for 10 days,,7 
This action was reportedly spearheaded by Circuit Judge Betty 
Binns Fletcher of Seattle.48 The order reasoned that a sufficient 
hearing had not been granted on new evidence that Harris' 
brother and partner in crime, Daniel, had shot one of the two 
victims Harris was convicted of murdering.49 
At 10:20 p.m., ten Ninth Circuit judges reinstated Judge 
Patel's TRO, thereby generating a second stay.IIO At 11:00 p.m., a 
41. See Appendix, pp. 203-08 (discussing procedural history). 
42. No. CR44135 (Super. Ct. S.D. County). 
43. See Appendix, p. 209. . 
44. Har~is v. Vasquez, 961 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992). 
45. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 790 F. Supp. 972, 973 (N.D. Cal.) (Noonan, 
J., dissenting in 966 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.», vacated as moot, 966 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1992). 
46. See Howard Mintz & Richard Barbieri, Will Ninth Circuit Fall in Line?, THE 
RECORDER, Apr. 22, 1992, at 1 (reporting that a spokeswoman for the American Civil 
Liberties Union said the judge was Judge John Noonan Jr., but that Judge Noonan could 
not be reached for comment). 
47. No. 92-55426 (9th Cir.) (first stay). Pursuant to existing Ninth Circuit rules, any 
single judge on the 28-member court may issue a stay of execution. 9TH CIK. R 22-5. 
48. Richard C. Paddock & Henry Weinstein, Appeal Judges Maneuvered Amid 
Chaos, LA TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at AI. 
49.Id. 
50. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, No. 92-70237 (9th Cir. 1992) (Canby, 
Fletcher, Hug, D.W. Nelson, T.G. Nelson, Noonan, Norris, Poole, Pregerson, and Rein-
hardt, J.J.) (second stay). 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/15
1993] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 161 
Ninth Circuit judgell1 issued a third stay, also on the cruel and 
unusual punishment issue.1I2 The State appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. At 11:20 p.m., the Supreme Court lifted 
the first stay.1I3 At 3:00 a.m., the justices, voting seven to two,1I4 
lifted the other two stays.1I11 
Shortly before 4:00 a.m., Judge Harry Pregerson granted 
Harris' ex parte motion "to deem this [cruel and unusual pun-
ishment] matter appropriately a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus"118 and issued the fourth stay of execution, this one reach-
ing the prison after Harris had already been strapped into the 
chair.1I7 At 5:45 a.m., the United States Supreme Court lifted the 
final stay and ordered that no more stays be issued except by 
the Supreme Court. liS Harris was executed 36 minutes later in 
the San Quentin gas chamber.lIs 
III. BACKGROUND 
Two federal remedies are available to state prisoners for 
postconviction complaints: habeas corpus80 and section 1983.81 
51. See Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 48, at Al (reporting that Judge William 
Norris issued the third stay). 
52. No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.) (third stay). 
53. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (1992) (No. A-766); see also Paddock & 
Weinstein, supra note 48, at AI. 
54. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (No. A-767) 
(per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 48 at 
AI. 
55. Gomez, 112 S. Ct. at 1653. 
56. No. C-92-1482-MHP (N.D. Cal.); No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.). 
57. No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.) (fourth stay). See John Johnson, Judge Harry Preger-
son: Choosing Between Law and His Conscience, LA TIMES, May 3, 1992, at B5. 
58. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992) (No. A-768). See Order From the 
Court, LA TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at All. 
59. Richard Barbieri', Harris' Last 15 Hours, THE RECORDER, Apr. 22, 1992, at 14. 
One day after Harris' execution, Judges Alarcon and Brunetti recalled and vacated their 
writ of mandamus and withdrew their opinion vacating Judge Patel's TRO as having 
been made moot by Harris' execution. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 966 F.2d 463 
(9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., concurring). 
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) (authorizing persons in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a state court to bring habeas corpus actions in federal court to challenge the fact 
or duration of their confinement). Section 2254(b) explicitly requires that a state pris-
oner exhaust available state court remedies before bringing a habeas corpus action. Sec-
tion 2254 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a 
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
7
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State prisoners have used habeas corpus and section 1983 almost 
interchangeably in postconviction litigation because the two 
statutes overlap. The federal habeas corpus statute for state 
prisoners is fairly narrow, remedying only "custody in violation 
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."62 In 
comparison, section 1983 provides a remedy for a broad range of 
violations, of constitutional rights under "color of' state law.6s 
Both statutes contemplate a civil remedy, but the latter does not 
have the prerequisite that all state remedies be exhausted.64 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States. 
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or 
that there is either an absence of available State corrective 
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such pro-
cess ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the mean-
ing of this section, if he has the right under the law of the 
State to raise, by any available procedure, the question 
presented. 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides: 
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
ble to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
62. See supra note 60. 
63. See supra note 61. 
64. The Supreme Court in 1886 began requiring that state prisoners exhaust state 
remedies before a federal court could exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Ex 
parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (denying federal writ until state trial proceedings 
finished); see also Ex parte' Fonda, 117 U.S. 516, 518 (1886) (exhaustion of state appel-
late remedies); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100, 101 (1894) (exhaustion of state postcon-
viction remedies); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950) (seeking writ of certiorari to 
Supreme Court before federal habeas corpus). In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the 
Court abandoned the Burford holding. Noia, 372 U.S. at 437. 
Congress codified the exhaustion doctrine in 1948. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988). How-
ever, the doctrine continues to be based on the policy of federal-state comity and does 
not impose a jurisdictional requirement on federal courts. 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, AR-
THUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261, at 651-
54 (1978). 
Conversely, a section 1983 claim cannot be blocked by imposing the exhaustion of 
state remedy requirement that would be appropriate to habeas relief. See Ellis v. Dyson, 
8
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Thus, the broad scope of section 1983 causes the statute to con-
ceivably envelop all habeas corpus petitions to federal courts by 
state prisoners. 
This potential for overlap did not create a problem until the 
1960's when section 1983 became a more widely recognized rem-
edy for constitutional violations.61i Since that time, state .prison-
ers have gradually turned to the broad language of section 1983 
as an alternative to habeas corpus relief.66 Federal courts there-
fore need clarification of the situations in which relief is appro-
priate under each remedy.67 Possible parameters for differentia-
tion include different elements,68 procedures,69 and remedies70 
available under each statute. The immediate access afforded by 
section 1983, coupled with the perception that claims receive 
more sympathetic hearings in federal court, may induce state 
prisoners to purposefully characterize their claims as section 
421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1990). 
65. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text. 
66. Maureen A. Dowd, A Comparison of Section 1983 and Federal Habeas Corpus 
in State Prisoners' Litigation, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1315, 1319 (1984). 
67. See, e.g., Michael Weinman, To Stay or Not to Stay: Choosing a Procedural 
Course for Prisoners' Suits Stating Claims Under Both Section 1983 and Habeas 
Corpus, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 733, 733-35 (1991) (posing several hypotheticals which 
are particularly pertinent); see also infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text. 
68. A petition for federal habeas corpus for a state prisoner must allege that the 
petitioner is in custody and that the detention violates the federal Constitution or stat-
ute. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). 
To state a claim under section 1983, on the other hand, the plaintiff must first allege 
that a person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, the plaintiff must allege that 
the person acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see, e.g., Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (explaining that a plaintiff need not also allege an offi-
cial acted in bad faith in order to state a claim for relief under section 1983). 
69. If a state prisoner petitions a federal district court for habeas corpus relief with-
out having exhausted available remedies, the district court will dismiss the petition. See 
supra note 60. 
With regard to section 1983 actions, in 1980, Congress passed the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1988), which outlines grievance proce-
dures a district court may require of a state prisoner bringing a section 1983 action to 
exhaust state remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1988). However, requiring exhaustion in these 
cases remains in the district court's discretion. The statute allows the court to continue 
(but not dismiss) a prisoner's section 1983 action for 90 days to require exhaustion of 
"such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available." 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a)(1) (1988). 
70. Federal habeas corpus relief is directed at relieving unconstitutional detention 
through an injunction ordering release of the state prisoner or a new trial. CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 332 (4th ed. 1983). 
Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to grant any form of legal and equitable relief 
to redress the violation of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
9
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.1983 actions.71 
Procedurally, access to section 1983 courts appears far less 
challenging than access to modern habeas corpus review. Recent 
procedural changes, including a more stringent review for "abuse 
of the writ"72 and a new doctrine of non-retroactivity,7S have 
substantially narrowed the scope and character of habeas 
corpus. These changes have made section 1983 all the more at-
tractive to state prisoners.74 
In 1973, responding to the lower courts' need for guidance 
in classifying habeas corpus and section 1983 suits, the Supreme 
Court articulated a basic distinction between the two remedies 
and provided an analytic framework for their proper classifica-
tion in Preiser u. Rodriguez.'" The Preiser court distinguished 
actions seeking only equitable relief to shorten a prisoner's sen-
tence, such as the one before it, from actions seeking only dam-
ages for alleged constitutional deprivations.76 The former was at 
its core an action for habeas corpus, requiring dismissal if the 
prisoner did not first exhaust state court remedies." The latter 
was not an action for habeas corpus because it did not challenge 
the fact or duration of the prisoner's confinement and could 
71. One reason Congress perceived access to a federal forum as crucial when enact-
ing section 1983 was that the state courts were perceived as more susceptible to local 
prejudice than the federal courts - prejudice which might cause their fact-finding 
processes to be defective. CONGo GLOBE, 42d ·Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1871); see Patsy v. 
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505 (1982). 
72. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (abuse of the writ is not confined 
to instances of deliberate abandonment, i.e., repeated habeas petitions and appeals as 
delaying tactics; petitioner can also abuse the writ by raising a claim in a subsequent 
petition that could have been raised in the first petition). 
73. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (defendant was not entitled to 
retroactive benefit of Supreme Court decision announced on same day as denial of his 
habeas corpus appeal); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (a habeas petitioner may not 
rely on new procedural rules of criminal law decided after that petitioner's conviction 
became final); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (deliberate failure to raise constitu-
tional issue on direct review precluded review of claim in federal habeas proceedings); 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (where there are second or successive federal 
habeas corpus petitions, it is proper for district court to expedite consideration of the 
petition). 
74. See 1989 DIH. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 181 (showing 12,372 peti-
tions for federal habeas corpus in 1989 as opposed to 25,957 civil rights actions on behalf 
of prisoners). 
75. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
76. Id. at 499. 
77.Id. 
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therefore be brought under section 1983 without exhaustion of 
state remedies.78 Although the Court intended Preiser to be the 
vehicle for resolving the potential overlap in federal remedies,. 
lower courts have continued to struggle to delineate the bounda-
ries of each remedy and to establish their proper roles, particu-
larly in cases where prisoners seek both types of relief.79 Such 
was the case in Harris.80 
A. THE "GREAT WRIT"81 OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Habeas Corpus, which literally means "produce the body," 
has historically been the procedural method by which federal 
courts have overseen state judicial systems to ensure their com-
pliance with federal constitutionallaw.82 The traditional purpose 
78.Id. 
79. Weinman, supra note 67, at 737-38. A court's procedural course may signifi-
cantly influence the results in hybrid section 1983/habeas corpus cases. For example, if 
the court requires the prisoner to stay the section 1983 claim ~hile exhausting state 
remedies, the doctrine of issue preclusion might bind the federal court by the state 
court's findings of law and fact. Conversely, if the court allows the prisoner to pursue 
both the section 1983 claim and the habeas corpus claim simultaneously, the federal 
court will decide the section 1983 claim as intended by Congress. Comity and federalism 
may suffer if the federal claim can go to judgment first because preclusion doctrines may 
require the state court to follow the prior federal decision in the section 1983 claim. This 
could allow federal courts to dictate the results in state proceedings. Id. 
For example, in Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.), the Ninth 
Circuit held that a state court's decision on a prisoner's constitutional claims in a habeas 
corpus proceeding precluded relitigation of the common issues in a subsequent section 
1983 action. 644 F.2d at 1347; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Ex parte 
Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 
80. Howard Mintz, Richard Barbieri and Lisa Stansky, Harris Counsel Playa Mean 
End Game, THE RECORDER, Apr. 20, 1992, at 1 (reporting that at a hearing on the after-
noon of April 17, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel quizzed lawyers on both sides 
about whether Harris' civil rights suit was really a disguised habeas bid). 
An important question left open by the Court in Preiser is exactly what type of 
claim is fundamentally a habeas corpus claim. The lower courts are split on whether the 
focus should be on the nature of the claim brought (one that challenges the conditions of 
confinements as opposed to one that challenges the validity of a sentence), or whether 
the focus should be on the nature of the relief sought (damages as opposed to declaratory 
or class relieO. See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating 
Conflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 
DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 130-73 (1988); Michael Weinman, supra note 67, at 50-55. 
81. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). 
82. The writ was originally used as early as the eleventh century in England to com-
pel appearance before the King's courts. Through the centuries, the writ developed into 
a means to obtain freedom from detention. See, e.g., Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal 
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982); William F. Duker, A 
Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1186 (1982). 
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of federal habeas corpus was to remedy constitutional infrac-
tions resulting in the unjust imprisonment of innocent defend-
ants.8S Chief Justice Warren heralded the "Great Writ" as "both 
the symbol and the guardian of individual liberty."8. 
The habeas corpus writ post trial is not a constitutional 
right. It is a statutory right which was created during the Recon-
struction Period following the Civil War.811 Congress feared that 
the states might resist the postwar constitutional amendments 
and challenge the federal court authority in criminal procedure, 
particularly in cases involving the newly freed slaves.88 
At the beginning of this century, the Supreme Court largely 
refrained from overseeing state trials. In Frank v. Mangum,87 for 
example, the Supreme Court refused to intervene and to over-
turn Leo Frank's murder conviction and death sentence despite 
evidence that he had been tried in a lynch mob atmosphere.88 
Eight years later, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in 
Frank8s was adopted by a majority of the Court in Moore v. 
83. See, e.g., Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855) (writ available to inquire 
into executive detention); Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822) (writ not 
available to attack conviction by court of competent jurisdiction). In each case, the Su-
preme Court followed the common law limitations on the writ. . 
Today, courts generally employ three forms of the common law writ of habeas 
corpus: 1) habeas corpus ad testificandum (secure prisoner's appearance as witIless); 2) 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum (deliver prisoner for tria!); and 3) habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum (inquire into the legality of detention). Use of the term "habeas corpus'" 
alone refers to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 
n.2 (1973). 
84. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968). 
85. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) 
(1976». See LARRY W. Y ACKLE. POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 85-86 (1981). 
86. See Y ACKLE, supra note 85, at 85-86. 
87. 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
88. This decision illustrated the Court's reluctance to exercise the broad habeas 
corpus jurisdiction granted by Congress. In Frank, the Court found that the prisoner 
could have federal habeas corpus relief for his claim that a mob dominated his trial only 
if such mob control took away the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 327. 
89. Id. at 345. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion provides a classic statement of the 
principles underlying the writ of habeas corpus: 
[H)abeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very 
tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside. not in 
subordination to the proceedings. and although every form 
may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have 
been more than an empty shell. 
Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the 
12
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Dempsey.9o There, the Court held that where state courts fail to 
protect basic constitutional rights, federal courts should inter-
vene.91 The Court emphasized that a state court process cannot 
be a mask for injustice: in such a scenario, the federal process 
must come into play.92 
The Warren Court substantially increased federal court 
habeas protection.9s As a result, federal habeas corpus petitions 
increasingly became a mechanism, particularly in death penalty 
cases, for setting aside death sentences.94 
However, the 1976 holding in Stone v. Powell9 /j was a har-
binger of future eviscerations of habeas corpus jurisdiction over 
constitutional claims unrelated to the integrity of the guilt-de-
termination process.98 Since 1976, in an effort to protect the role 
phrase "due process of law," there can be no doubt that it em-
braces the fundamental conception of a fair trial .... Weare 
not speaking of mere disorder, or mere irregularities in proce-
dure, but of a case where the processes of justice are actually 
subverted. In such a case, the Federal court has jurisdiction to 
issue the writ. 
[d. at 346-47. 
90. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
91. [d. at 91-92 (overruling part of the Frank decision and holding that on a habeas 
corpus petition, a district court must determine the facts even though the state court 
had already rendered judgment); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) 
(violation of constitutional right to counsel robs the trial court of jurisdiction). 
92. Moore, 261 U.S. at 91-92 (affirming that federal habeas corpus was available to 
state prisoners only if the convicting court lacked jurisdiction). 
93. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court expounded on the his-
torical role of habeas corpus, stating: "We do well to bear in mind the extraordinary 
prestige of the Great Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence." [d. at 399-400 (footnote omitted). The Court continued: 
It is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played 
a central role in national crises, wherein the claims of order 
and of liberty clash most acutely, not only in England in the 
seventeenth century, but also in America from our very begin-
nings, and today. Although in form the Great Writ is simply a 
mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with 
the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. 
[d. at 401 (footnotes omitted). 
94. A report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that close to 40% of death 
sentences which are commuted are set aside because of constitutional errors that were 
found by the federal courts in the state court proceedings. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIC. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. HABEAS CORPUS 5-6 (1984). 
95. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying habeas review of fourth amendment claims where 
state court provided a "full and fair" opportunity for hearing the claims). 
96. [d. at 493-95. Justice Powell gathered a majority of the Court to curtail the op-
portunity of state prisoners to use federal habeas corpus to relitigate fourth amendment 
13
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of state courts in the enforcement of federal law, the Rehnquist 
Court has erected various procedural barriers to the assertion of 
claims of constitutional violations presented in federal habeas 
actions.97 
For example, in 1977, the Supreme Court articulated the 
"cause-and-prejudice" test in Wainwright v. Sykes. 98 The new 
standard barred federal habeas review of certain state prisoners' 
constitutional claims.99 If a state prisoner failed to lodge a 
timely objection under state rules, that claim was barred unless 
the prisoner could show: 1) cause for the noncompliance, and 2) 
actual prejudice from the alleged violation. loo After Wainwright, 
the law appeared to be settled: if the state denied the claim on 
the merits, the petitioner was automatically entitled to federal 
habeas review. IOI If, on the other hand, the state denied the 
claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner was barred from 
federal habeas review absent a showing of cause and 
prejudice. lo2 But over the last two years, the Supreme Court has 
begun to reexamine this area of jurisprudence and the line be-
tween substance and procedure. 
Substantively, the Supreme Court has drastically narrowed 
the scope of its review. The Supreme Court has held that even 
in a case in which there are real constitutional questions that 
have not been developed factually in a state appeal, the federal 
courts need not intervene. lOS 
Most recently, the Court examined the issue of whether the 
Constitution even bars the execution of a person who has a valid 
claims which the state had already given the prisoner a full and fair opportunity to air in 
state courts. One premise of Powell's opinion was that state courts are equally competent 
with federal courts to hear and decide such claims. Id. at 493-94 n.35. 
97. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative 
'Reform' of Federal Habeas Corpus, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
98. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (substantially narrowing the cause and prejudice standard 
first set forth in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963». 
99. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87. 
100. [d. 
101. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 544-46, 551 (1981). 
102. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87. 
103. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). In a 5 to 4 vote, Justice O'Connor authored the dissenting opinion, arguing that the 
decisions of the Warren Court were codified by Congress more than 25 years ago, and 
that it is inappropriate for the Supreme Court to attempt to change what Congress has 
done. Id. at 1721. 
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claim to innocence.lo, This complex issue involves weighing a 
state's right to carry out its mandates against the preservation of 
an innocent individual's right to life. 
Procedurally, state prisoners must now jump over a series of 
very difficult hurdles before their cases can be heard by the fed-
eral courts. Beginning in 1989, the Supreme Court articulated a 
new doctrine of non-retroactivity based on a model first pro-
posed by Justice John Harlan in the 1960's. 1011 The new non-ret-
roactivity doctrine focuses on a defendant's procedural pos-
ture,106 and largely ignores the purposes and effects of the 
specific constitutional rights involved.l07 
In 1991, the Court moved even closer to Chief Justice Rehn-
quists's goal of streamlining the federal review processl08 with its 
McCleskey v. Zant decision. loe In McCleskey, Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, established a more stringent standard 
of review for abuse of the writ, making it even more difficult for 
inmates to obtain relief when raising new claims in subsequent 
federal habeas petitions.110 
104. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). The State of Texas argued that the 
state appeals process is adequate, and that if there is exculpatory evidence, Herrera 
should seek clemency from the governor, not help from the federal courts. Justice 
Antonin Scalia said a ruling in favor of the defense would open the floodgates of prisoner 
appeals: "The burden this would put on our system of justice is enormous." Joan Bis-
kupic, High Court's Unusual Issue In Death Case, S.F: CHRON., Oct. 8, 1992, at AI. 
In the decade between 1954 and 1963, the number of habeas corpus petitions filed 
increased 352%, and by 1963 habeas corpus petitions comprised 3.3% of the total federal 
caseload. 1963 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 200-201 (In 1963, 2,106 habeas corpus petitions were filed, out of a total 
of 63,630 civil actions commenced in 1963); 1954 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 101, 106 (598 habeas corpus peti-
tions out of a total of 59,461 civil actions were commenced in federal courts in 1954). 
By 1976 annual filings of federal habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners had 
grown 372% and constituted 6% of the total federal court caseload. 1976 ANN. REP. OF 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 296, 300 
(7,833 habeas corpus petitions were filed in 1976, out of 130,597 total civil actions 
commenced). 
105. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). 
106. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989). 
107. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965). 
108. Mintz & Barbieri, supra note 46, at 1. "Chief Justice William Rehnquist is a 
leading critic of unduly long capital appeals." Id. 
109. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
110.' Id. at 1470. The decision limits most federal reviews of state criminal convic-
tions to one trip through the habeas system. Id. 
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B. NARROWING HABEAS CORPUS: THE DOCTRINE OF 
RETROACTIVITY 
The Supreme Court first decided that new constitutional 
rules need not always be applied retroactively in Linkletter v. 
Walker.ll1 Linkletter established that the "Constitution neither 
prohibits nor requires retrospective effect" for new ·constitu-
tional rules of procedure. ll2 The Court created a balancing test 
for analyzing the question of retroactivity that required consid-
eration of the "prior history of the rule in question, its purpose 
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or 
retard its operation."lIs 
Justice Harlan criticized the Court's adoption of the Lin-
kletter test and formulated his own retroactivity criteria based 
on the distinction between direct and collateral review.m He 
recommended that all new rules be applied retroactively to cases 
not yet final, and that no new rule be applied retroactively to 
cases that were final. 115 Justice Harlan's main premise for this 
distinction was a widely shared concern that litigation should 
not continue indefinitely. lIe 
Justice Harlan argued that habeas review serves two basic 
purposes, neither of which requires that habeas petitioners bene-
fit from new rules. First, "it seeks to assure that no man has 
been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermis-
sibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted."1l7 Second, it 
111. 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (determining when the exclusionary rule should be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review). 
112. Id. at 629. 
113. Id. The Court articulated this standard as a three-pronged test in Stovell v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1968). New rules must be measured by: (a) the purpose to be 
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on 
old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive applica-
tion of the new standards. Id. at 297. 
114. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); De-
sist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
115. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675; Desist, 394 U.S. at 256. 
116. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691 (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting): "No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, 
not society as a whole is benefitted by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to 
jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be 
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved."). 
117. Desist, 394 U.S. at 262. 
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acts as a necessary incentive for trial and appellate courts to 
conduct their pr·oceedings in accordance with constitutional 
standards.118 
Justice Harlan recognized two exceptions where new rules 
could be applied to those on habeas review: first, where new sub-
stantive due process rules "place, as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual con-
duct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe";119 and second, where procedures "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty" are violated.120 
Endorsing Justice Harlan's view of retroactivity, the Court 
in Teague v. Lane121 held that "new" constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure generally should not apply retroactively to 
federal habeas review of state criminal convictions that became 
"final" before the "new law" was established.122 Having accepted 
the essential distinction of the Harlan test, the plurality opinion 
greatly expanded the definition of "new law" and reduced the 
scope of Justice Harlan's proposed exceptions.u3 
According to Teague v. Lane124 and its successor, Penry v. 
Lynaugh,12& a new rule of constitutional law may be applied on 
collateral review126 if it falls within one of three narrow excep-
tions.127 The first exception is a new rule that places "certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power 
of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."128 The sec-
ond exception is a new rule "without which the li.kelihood of an 
accurate conviction is seriously diminished."129 The third excep-
tion is for new rules "prohibiting a certain category of punish-
118. [d. at 262-63. 
119. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692. 
120. [d. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
121. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
122. [d. at 310. 
123. [d. at 311-15. As a result, today's retroactivity doctrine places a much heavier 
burden on a petitioner than the one proposed by Justice Harlan. 
124. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
125. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
126. [d. at 329. 
127. [d. at 329-30. 
128. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
129. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. 
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ment for a class of defendants because of their status or 
offense. "130 
Teague represents a dramatic step in restricting federal 
habeas review of state court decisions. It mandates that unless 
the rule in a case is "dictated by precedent existing at the time 
the defendant's conviction became final," the case must be 
barred from federal court review. I31 The Court offered little for-
mal guidance in interpreting the scope of a "new rule."132 How-
ever, the cases cited by the Court as examples of "new rules" 
seem to reflect a fairly broad reading. ls3 In addition, the Court's 
stated desire to stem the flow of habeas petitions suggests that it 
will read Teague broadly.I34 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for 
the majority of the Court in Butler u. McKellarlSr> declared that 
the definition of "new law" as announced in Teague, "validates 
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents 
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary 
to later decisions. "136 Thus, even if the state court reached the 
wrong result, in light of subsequent decisions, it did so "in good 
faith" and requires no habeas "deterrence" message. 
C. SECTION 1983 
Section 1983 provides a remedy in federal court for people 
130. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. 
131. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
132. "New law," as defined in Teague, is the result of any case that "breaks new 
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal government," or in 
which "the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's 
conviction became final." Id. 
133. In each instance, the Court referred to a case that did not overturn an old rule, 
but rather introduced a rule where none had previously existed. In Teague, the Court 
cites several habeas cases in which new rules were fashioned. Id; see, e.g., Rock v. Arkan-
sas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (criminal defendants have a right to testify on their own behalf, 
and Arkansas' rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony impermissibly in-
fringes on that right); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (eighth amendment pro-
hibits sentencing prisoner to death where the Court had never decided whether the Con-
stitution forbids the execution of the insane). 
134. Shortly before the Teague decision was handed down, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
(addressing the American Bar Association) outlined some measures to limit the number 
of habeas petitions and to streamline the process. He also complained that "litigation 
ultimately resolved in favor of the state takes literally years." The Third Branch, 21 
BULL. OF FED. CTS. 6 (Feb. 1989). 
135. 494 U.S. 407 (1990). 
136. Id. at 414. 
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whose federally-guaranteed rights have been infringed by per-
sons acting under color of state law.137 Congress passed section 
1983 in response to the ineffectiveness of state courts in dealing 
with the reign of terror wrought by the Ku Klux Klan in the 
aftermath of the Civil War.1SS 
For many years after its enactment, the scope, reach, and 
requirements of section 1983 remained unclear. In the late 
1800's and early 1900's, the Supreme Court limited the effective-
ness of the Civil Rights Act as a remedy for violations of consti-
tutional rights.1s9 Then in 1961, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Monroe v. PapeHO helped to define the role of section 1983.141 
The Monroe Court listed the three basic purposes of section 
1983: 1) to override discriminatory state laws; 2) to provide a 
remedy where state law was inadequate; and 3) "to provide a 
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in the-
ory, was not available in practice.!!}42 The Supreme Court held 
that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases where state offi-
cials infringed upon federally-protected rights.14s The Court also 
emphasized that federal courts should exercise this jurisdiction 
even in cases where section 1983 plaintiffs have not exhausted 
state remedies. 144 
Although Monroe did not involve a state prisoner claim, 
three years later, the Court expanded its ruling by holding that 
137. See supra note 61 (setting forth the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
138. Section 1983 originated as section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Act of 
Apr. 2, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
139. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (narrowly defining the sub-
stantive rights protected by the fourteenth amendment which the Act enforced and lim-
iting fourteenth amendment protection to rights related to the national government). 
In addition, the Court refused to allow Congress to proscribe purely private conduct. 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). 
140. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The holding in Monroe was overruled by Monell v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
141. In Monroe, the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs to recover under section 1983 
from local police officers who physically abused them during a search and seizure. 
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168-70, 192. 
142. [d. at 173-74. 
143. [d. at 180-83. 
144. The Court stated: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced 
would give relief. The federal remedy [section 1983] is supplementary to the state rem-
edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is in-
voked." [d. at 183. 
19
Cox: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
174 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:155 
a state prisoner could sue prison officials under section 1983.IU 
Since Monroe, the Court has recognized the importance of a 
right to immediate access to a federal forum under section 
1983.146 Today, although still reluctant to interfere in state 
prison administration, federal courts will intervene when an im-
portant federal constitutional or statutory right is at stake. 147 
Generally, a section 1983 claim cannot be blocked by impos-
ing the exhaustion-of-state-remedies standard that is required 
for habeas relief. 148 Yet, under the principles developed in Stone 
v. Powell,149 a state prisoner is precluded from litigating consti-
tutional claims in a section 1983 action despite the fact that 
those claims could not be heard on a petition for habeas. lllo The 
same principle of preclusion applies when a litigant has wrong-
fully failed to raise a section 1983 claim in a previous state court 
proceeding. m 
Some courts addressing the question of which procedural 
145. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (state prisoner alleged infringement of free-
dom of religion). 
146. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). A plaintiff need not pursue 
state remedies before proceeding with a claim under section 1983 because Congress en-
acted section 1983 "to 'throw open the doors of the United States courts' to individuals 
who were threatened with, or who had suffered the deprivation of constitutional rights 
and to provide these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding 
any provision of state law to the contrary." [d. at 503-04 (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871». 
In Patsy, the Court confirmed that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is 
not a prerequisite to a section 1983 action. The Court reasoned that requiring a plaintiff 
to exhaust state administrative remedies before commencing a section 1983 suit would be ' 
fundamentally at odds with section 1983's goal of providing the plaintiff with the choice 
of a federal forum to redress deprivations of federal rights. [d. at 507-08 (emphasis 
added). 
147. See Bell V. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (discarding "hands-off" approach 
while avoiding undue interference). 
148. See, e.g., Ellis V. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975); Young V. Kenny, 907 F.2d 
874, 875 (9th Cir. 1990). 
149. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on 
habeas unless the state court fails to provide "full and fair" opportunity for hearing on 
the merits of a claim). 
150. Allen V. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104-05 (1980). 
151. Migra V. Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1984). The prior state court pro-
ceeding, however, must have been adjudicative of the section 1983 issue in order for res 
judicata to apply. If those rights could not have been litigated in the state proceeding, 
then a criminal defendant is not precluded from bringing a section 1983 action to vindi-
cate his constitutional rights. Haring V. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316-17.(1983). 
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course to follow in hybrid section 1983/habeas corpus cases fear 
that federal disposition of a section 1983 action prior to the state 
court's reaching a final decision on a habeas corpus issue will 
cause the federal court unduly to interfere with an ongoing state 
court proceeding, thus conflicting with the rule set forth in 
Younger v. Harris.m According to the Younger Court, the un-
derlying reasons for this prohibition were notions of federalism 
and comity, which the Court defined as: 
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition 
of the fact that the entire country is made up of a 
Union of separate state governments, and a con-
tinuance of the belief that the National Govern-
ment will fare best if the States and their institu-
tions are left free to perform their separate 
functions in their separate ways. us 
The Court concluded that comity and federalism prohibited the 
federal courts from enjoining state proceedings unless the state 
action was the result of "bad faith or harassment,"lM or if a stat-
ute was "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitu-
tional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph,"lllll 
or in "any other unusual circumstance that would call for equi-
table relief."1116 
The Supreme Court has applied the Younger abstention 
doctrine to claims seeking declaratory relief that would threaten 
a pending state proceeding,1I17 and has extended Younger to pro-
hibit federal courts from enjoining state civil proceedings in 
which the state is a party, as well as cases in which important 
state interests are at stake. us Most recently, the Court has ap-
plied Younger to a suit between two private parties implicating 
152. In Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), a section 1983 action seeking to enjoin a prose-
cution under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, the Supreme Court held that "the 
national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceed-
ings except under special circumstances" prohibited injunctions against ongoing criminal 
proceedings. [d. at 41. 
153. [d. at 44. 
154. [d. at 54. 
155. [d. at 53 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941». 
156. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. 
157. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). 
158. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (federal equitable interference 
precluded in pending civil action); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (party 
must exhaust state appellate remedies before seeking relief in federal court). 
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important governmental interests.11l9 
IV THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Harris' use of section 1983 as the vehicle for his lethal gas 
protest was scrutinized by the Ninth Circuit. The State of Cali-
fornia petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus va-
cating the TRO issued by United States District Judge Marilyn 
Hall Patel.160 The TRO, granted in connection with Harris' sec-
tion 1983 gas chamber lawsuit, enjoined the state from using le-
thal gas in Harris' execution.161 
A. REJECTING THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING 
In granting the State's petition for a writ of mandamus, the 
Ninth Circuit scrutinized the fact that Harris simultaneously 
filed a section 1983 class action in federal court and a habeas 
corpus petition in state court.162 In his state court habeas peti-
tion, however, Harris did not raise the lethal gas argument, in-
stead reserving that claim solely for the federal action.163 Judge 
Alarcon, writing for the majority, noted that in each of five prior 
state petitions for habeas corpus, Harris never challenged the 
use of lethal gas as a method of execution.16" 
The court held that by failing to include this claim in the 
state habeas corpus proceedings, Harris had deliberately by-
passed state review of his claim that execution by lethal gas is 
cruel and unusual punishment.1611 The court found this tactic to 
be clearly violative of national policies of comity and federalism, 
i.e., "that federal courts should not intervene in state court pro-
ceedings nor assume that state court judges will deny litigants 
159. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). "Younger abstention is mandated if 
the State's interests in the proceedings are so important that exercise of the federal judi-
cial power would disregard the comity extended between the States and the National 
Government." Id. at 10. 
160. Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
161. Id. at 971. 
162. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 790 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal.) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting in 966 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.», vacated as moot, 966 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1992). 
163. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. at 972-73. 
164. Id. at 973. 
165. Id. at 974. 
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their federal constitutional rights."166 
Because Harris did not give the California courts an oppor-
tunity to adjudicate his claim that death by lethal gas violates 
the Constitution, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court 
should have abstained from ruling on his motion for a temporary 
injunction.167 Therefore, a majority of the three-judge panel of 
the Ninth Circuit found that the district court's decision to issue 
the TRO was clearly erroneous, and vacated the district court's 
order.16s 
B. JUDGE NOONAN'S DISSENT 
The dissent was authored by Judge John Noonan/69 who 
later that day voted with a panel of ten Ninth Circuit judges to 
reinstate the TRO.170 Judge Noonan based his dissent on three 
factors: 1) The Ninth Circuit panel may not have complied with 
Ninth Circuit rules when it issued the writ of mandamus vacat-
ing Judge Patel's T~O; 2) The Ninth Circuit panel's decision to 
vacate Judge Patel's TRO conflicted with settled precedent; and 
3) Issuing the writ of mandamus to proceed with Harris' execu-
tion could result in an irreparable violation of the Constitution 
of the United States.17l 
1. Compliance with Ninth Circuit Mandamus Rules 
Citing Ninth Circuit Rules 22-1172 and 22-2,178 Judge Noo-
166. [d. 
167. [d. at 975. 
168 [d. 
169. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 966 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1992). 
170. No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.). 
171. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 461. 
172. 9TH CIR. R. 22-1 provides: 
The following rules apply to all proceedings within the juris-
diction of this court in cases brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 involving a sentence of death, including appeals from or-
ders of United States District Courts granting or denying 
habeas corpus relief, motions for stays of execution, or appli-
cations for certificates of probable cause. To the extent that 
other Circuit Rules are inconsistent with these rules, these 
rules apply. 
173. 9TH CIR. R. 22-2 provides: 
The panel to which the case is assigned shall handle all mat-
23
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nan questioned whether the Ninth Circuit panel had jurisdiction 
to issue mandamus in the Harris case.174 Indeed, because Harris' 
lawsuit was filed as a section 1983 action and not a habeas peti-
tion, Judge Noonan reasoned it may not have fit within the pa-
rameters of Rule 22-2 either.l7II Judge Noonan asserted it was 
"certainly arguable whether [Harris' lawsuit] is a 'collateral mat-
ter' which 'questions the sentence.' "176 If not, Judge Noonan 
concluded the three-judge Ninth Circuit panel may have lacked 
jurisdiction. 177 
2. Settled Precedent: The Standard of Review 
Assuming the Ninth Circuit panel properly exercised its ju-
risdiction in Harris' lethal gas action, Judge Noonan questioned 
their finding that Judge Patel's order was clearly erroneous. 
Judge Noonan recited the standard governing mandamus set 
forth in Bauman v. United States178 and reexamined the key 
issues pertaining to the issuance of a TRO: 1) Did the balance of 
hardships tip in favor of the party seeking the order? and 2) 
Were there "serious questions" presented?179 After assessing 
each issue, Judge Noonan dissented from the majority opinion, 
asserting that Judge Patel had correctly evaluated both of these 
factors.180 
ters pertaining to the case, including motions for a stay of exe-
cution, applications for certificate of probable cause, the mer-
its, appeals from second or successive petitions, remands from 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and all incidental 
and collateral matters, including any separate proceedings 
questioning the conviction or sentence. 
174. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 461. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. Judge Noonan also pointed out the time lag between the court's order of 
mandamus at 11:00 p.m. on Sunday evening and issuance of the opinion in support of 
the writ at 3:00 p.m. the following day. Thus, the opinion technically lacked any ration-
ale for over 12 hours. Id. (citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967». 
178. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462, (citing Bauman v. United States, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 
(9th Cir. 1977)). Under Bauman, the Ninth Circuit panel has jurisdiction to issue a writ 
of mandamus if "the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law." 
Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654-55. 
179. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462. 
180. Id. at 463. 
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a. Balance of Hardshipslsl 
Judge Noonan agreed with Judge Patel's finding that the 
balance of hardships tipped in favor of the restraining order. ls2 
Judge Noonan reasoned that death in a cruel manner is an in-
jury that can never be repaired, whereas a postponement in the 
carrying out of an execution is, an injury "more psychological 
and intangible than substantial. "lS3 
b. Serious Questionsls4 
Judge Noonan identified three serious questions. lSII The first 
concerned the Younger abstention doctrine. ls6 Specifically, the 
question was whether the federal court should have abstained 
from intervening to prevent the execution of a state judgment.ls7 
Judge Noonan noted that an interpretation of Younger which 
construed judicial proceedings to last through execution would 
be highly impractical. ISS He reasoned that such an interpretation 
would preclude all habeas corpus petitions by death penalty in-
mates from the beginning of the prosecution until the moment 
of death, a result surely not intended by the Younger court.lS9 
The second serious question dealt with the issue of whether 
181. The court, through this process, weighs the effect of its decision on the inter-
ests of the parties involved. See Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 
1217 (9th Cir. 1987) ("To qualify for a preliminary injunction, the moving party must 
show ... that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in 
the moving party's favor."). In this case, Judge Noonan balanced the potential for suffer-
ing by Harris pursuant to the lethal gas execution against the state's interest in proceed-
ing with the scheduled execution in an orderly manner. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462. 
182. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462. 
183. Id. 
184. If Judge Patel's holding is read to indicate that the balance of hardships tipped 
sharply in Harris' favor, then Ninth Circuit precedent required only that Harris raise 
questions serious enough to require litigation, not that he demonstrate a strong possibil-
ity of success on the merits of his suit. See Benda v. Grand Lodge, 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th 
Cir. 1978). In such a case, it would have been within Judge Patel's discretion to grant the 
TRO. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462. 
185. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462. 
186. Id. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971». 
187. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462. The state argued that the abstention doctrine set forth 
initially in Younger and developed by its progeny has been extended so that a federal 
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the section 1983 class action, so far as it affected Harris, was an 
impermissible evasion of the ordinary requirements for habeas 
corpus. ISO Judge Noonan analyzed the problem in the following 
manner. Generally, a section 1983 claim cannot be blocked by 
imposing the exhaustion-of-state-remedy requirement that 
would be appropriate to habeas relief. lSI However, the State con-
tended that in reality, Harris' lawsuit, while on its face a section 
1983 claim, was actually brought only to prevent Harris' execu-
tion. ls2 Therefore, the State contended, the section 1983 action, 
at least so far as it pertained to Harris, was really a petition for 
habeas corpus, and should be treated as such. ISS 
But Judge Noonan reasoned that turning a section 1983 ac-
tion into a habeas petition for Harris and barring it for lack of 
exhaustion would have serious ramifications. IS. He emphasized 
that no other circuit has held that an Eighth Amendment claim 
regarding the mode of execution is only cognizable under habeas 
corpus. lSII 
The final serious question Judge Noonan recited was the is-
sue of whether death by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. ls6 Judge Noonan 
found that "evolving standards of decency" are an appropriate 
consideration under Weems v. United States. 197 In examining 
the current standard of human decency in these matters, Judge 
Noonan therefore determined that the indicia should be objec-
tive, and that the best index is the practice of other state legisla-
tures. lSS Judge Noonan emphasized that only two states other 
190. Id. 
191. [d. at 462·63 (citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) and Young v. 
Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1990». 
192. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 462. 
193. Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
194. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 463 (citing Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 
(1971) and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 482 (1973». 
195. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 463. Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have considered 
challenges to the manner of execution as properly raised under Section 1983. [d. (citing 
Sullivan v. Dugger, 721 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1983) and Byrne v. Roemer, 847 F.2d 1130 
(5th Cir. 1988». 
196. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 463. 
197. [d. (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910». 
198. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 963 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 
(1989». 
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than California authorized death by lethal gas.199 
3. A Serious Constitutional Question 
Judge Noonan concluded that, with regard to the issue of 
whe.ther or not the use of lethal gas in carrying out an execution 
is cruel and unusual punishment, the balance of hardships 
weighed in favor of Harris and serious questions were posed.20o 
Thus, carrying out Harris' death sentence in a cruel and unusual 
manner would result in an irreparable violation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and Judge Patel had properly granted 
the TRO.201 
C. THE SUPREME COURT 
Following the Ninth Circuit panel's decision to vacate the 
district court's TRO,202 ten Ninth Circuit judges issued an order 
reinstating it.203 The Supreme Court subsequently issued an 
opinion vacating the TRO, providing several reasons for its 
decision.204 
First, the Supreme Court noted that under McCleskey v. 
Zant,20& Harris was required to show cause. for his failure to pre-
sent his cruel and unusual punishment claim in his earlier 
habeas petitions.206 The Supreme Court pointed out that Harris 
had filed four prior federal habeas petitions (and eight prior 
state habeas petitions), and that he had no convincing explana-
tion for his failure to raise the cruel and unusual punishment 
199. Gomez, 966 F.2d at 463. The first was Maryland, which had not had an execu-
tion since 1961. The other was Arizona, where in reaction to the execution of Don Eu-
gene Harding on April 6, 1992, the Arizona state legislature took steps to abandon lethal 
gas as a means of execution. Legislation was proposed in response to substantial medical 
evidence that unnecessary suffering was inflicted in Harding's execution. [d. Further-
more, eight states in the preceding 15 years had abolished execution by lethal gas. [d. 
200. [d. 
201. [d. at 461. 
202. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 790 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
203. No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.) (second stay). 
204. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam) 
(No. A-767). In addition to vacating the second stay, this decision also vacated a third 
stay issued by a single Ninth Circuit judge. [d; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompa-
nying text. 
205. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
206. Gomez, 112 S. Ct. at 1653. 
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claim at an earlier date.207 
The Court held that even if McCleskey did not bar the 
claim, Harris was precluded on equitable grounds from asserting 
the claim.208 First, the Court reasoned that Harris' failure to 
raise his cruel and unusual claim 14 years earlier constituted 
abusive delay.209 Second, such delay was compounded by last-
minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process.210 The 
Court also considered the State's strong interest in proceeding 
with its judgment.211 Finally, the Court determined that it was 
appropriate to consider the last-minute nature of an application 
to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.212 _ 
Concluding that Harris had failed to show cause for his fail-
ure to raise the gas chamber claim in his prior petitions, the 
Court vacated the stay of execution granted by the ten judges of 
the Ninth Circuit.218 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. HABEAS VS. SECTION 1983: A TACTICAL MANEUVER 
Filing a section 1983 class action just one week before Har-
ris was scheduled to be executed was a stroke of genius and 
desperation on the part of his lawyers.214 Facially, a class action 
protesting the gas chamber as a mode of execution would not be 
classified as an appropriate habeas action, since it does not dis-
pute the fact or length of imprisonment. Moreover, Harris ar-
gued that the Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual 
punishment upon which the action was founded involves an 
evolving standard of decency.2111 As such, the claim could not 
have been raised earlier, during his 12 prior habeas petitions, for 
207. Id. 
208. Id. Notably, the Supreme Court applied a civil standard to Harris' request for 
an injunction in a criminal proceeding. See id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. For example, Harris raised his claim as a section 1983 action despite the 




214. Fierro v. Gomez, No. 92-1489-MHP (N.D. Cal.). 
215. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989). 
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example, because it became ripe only after the execution by le-
thal gas of Don Eugene Harding in Arizona on April 6, 1992.216 
Harding's execution was immediately followed by the aban-
donment of that mode of execution by the State's attorney gen-
eral,217 Therefore, Harris argued that this was an indication that 
the standard for what constituted "cruel and unusual" had 
evolved. Harris further argued that he could not file his class 
action suit until after his appeal for clemency from Governor 
Wilson was denied, thereby assuring the mode of his death.21s 
The section 1983 lawsuit was filed on behalf of all California 
death row inmates and claimed that execution by lethal gas con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.219 The Supreme 
Court properly recognized the section 1983 action as an attempt 
to avoid the application of McCleskey v. Zant.220 
Professors Caminker and Chemerinsky assert that the Su-
preme Court mistakenly applied habeas corpus rules, i.e., the 
McCleskey bar against successive habeas claims for relief, to a 
p~operly filed section 1983 claim.221 This is not the case for two 
reasons. 
First, arguably, the Supreme Court did not mistakenly char-
acterize Harris' claim, and did not use McCleskey as a reason for 
vacating the stays. The exact language reads: 
This case is an obvious attempt to avoid the 
application of McCleskey v. Zant to bar this suc-
cessive claim for relief. Harris has now filed four 
216. Harding.was not pronounced dead until ten minutes after two cyanide pellets 
were dropped into a bowl of sulfuric acid beneath his chair. Witnesses described a grue-
some scene of Harding gasping, shuddering and desperately making obscene gestures 
with both strapped-down hands. Nation in Brief, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Apr. 25, 
1992, at A6. 
217. Members of the Arizona House of Representatives, disturbed by graphic ac-
counts of Harding's slow death, voted 41-7 on Thursday, April 23, 1992, to switch the 
method of execution from gas to lethal injection. Gruesome Death in Gas Chamber 
Pushes Arizona Toward Injections, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1992, at 9. 
218. See Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
219. Id. at 967. 
220. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992). 
221. Caminker & Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 237. 
29
Cox: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
184 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:155 
prior federal habeas petitions. He has made no 
convincing showing of cause for his failure to raise 
this claim in his prior petitions. 
Even if we were to assume, however, that 
Harris could avoid the application of McCleskey 
to bar his claim, we would not consider it on the 
merits. Whether his claim is framed as a habeas 
petition or § 1983 action, Harris seeks an equita-
ble remedy. m 
The language by Justice O'Connor recognized Harris' at-
tempt to circumvent the McCleskey standard.22s It also sug-
gested that under McCleskey, Harris' claim would fai1. 224 But 
the Court's ultimate holding was not based on the McCleskey 
reasoning. Rather, it rested entirely on a balancing of the 
eq uities. 2211 
As further evidence of the Court's intent, the Court took the 
unusual step of issuing an amended opinion on May 6, 1992.226 
Originally, the language of the opinion read, "Harris claims that 
his execution by lethal gas is cruel and unusual in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment."227 The amended opinion reads, "Har-
ris brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming that his execu-
tion by lethal gas is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment."228 Thus, the Court, while convinced that Harris' 
gas chamber action was an attempt to avoid McCleskey, was 
cognizant that Harris had filed a section 1983 action, not a 
habeas petition. 
The more difficult question is whether section 1983 was an 
appropriate vehicle for Harris' gas chamber action. Harris was 
seeking injunctive relief, not damages. Under the Court's analy-
sis in Preiser u. Rodriguez,228 his action was therefore arguably 
at its core an action for habeas corpus. Harris sought to chal-
222. Gomez, 112 S. Ct. at 1653. 
223. [d. 
224. [d. 
225. [d.; see text accompanying supra notes 208-13. 
226. Supreme Court Proceedings, U.S.L.W. - DAILY EDITION, May 20, 1992. 
227. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 60 U.S.L.W. 3733 (1992). 
228. Gomez, 112 S. Ct. at 1653 (emphasis added). 
229. See 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). 
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lenge one of the facts of his execution,2S0 not the conditions of 
his imprisonment.231 The Preiser court specifically stated that a 
challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must be 
brought by way of a petition for habeas corpus.232 Consequently, 
Harris' action was arguably more appropriately a habeas peti-
tion rather than a section 1983 action. Yet he sought to chal-
lenge a constitutional infringement, the imposition of a cruel 
and unusual punishment, for which the federal courts are an ap-
propriate forum . 
. Harris' case is a classic example of the confusion surround-
ing attempts by federal courts to properly distinguish between 
habeas corpus and section 1983 actions in the aftermath of 
Preiser.233 Congress has considered numerous proposals for 
habeas reform,234 but no new legislation has been enacted. 
One possible solution would be to eliminate section 1983 al-
together as a remedy for state prisoners' claims and establish an 
expanded federal habeas corpus as the sole remedy for those 
claims. The scope of the expanded habeas corpus provisions 
would necessarily include remedies for complaints concerning 
230. By challenging the means of execution, Harris was in essence challenging a ju-
dicial pronouncement. It was the pronouncement of Superior Court Judge Eli Levenson 
that: "Robert Alton Harris shall be put to death by the administration of lethal gas." 
Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966, 968 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
231. The Supreme Court has declined to address whether conditions of confinement 
claims may be brought under habeas. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6 (1979). 
232. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-90. 
233. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
234. See, e.g., REPORT AND PROPOSAL OF THE AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES: Hearing on S. 88, S. 1757, and S. 1760 Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1990) (concluding the current 
habeas corpus doctrine promotes unnecessary delay and repetitious litigation which are 
not essential to providing fairness to capital defendants); THE HABEAS CORPUS REFORM 
ACT OF 1982: Hearing on S. 2216 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (proposing various limitations on federal habeas, including a one-
year statute of limitations and a narrower standard of review); Proposed 28 U.S.C. § 
2256, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 63-66, reprinted in 1968 U.S. C.C.A.N. 2150-53 (proposing elimination of 
federal habeas as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners); Habeas Corpus: Hearings 
on H.R. 5649 Before Subcommittee No.3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955) (proposing limitation of federal habeas to situations in which no 
hearing on merits is possible in state court either before or after filing of habeas 
petition). 
Comments concerning the role of habeas corpus apply equally well to the relation-
ship between section 1983 and habeas corpus. Congress should determine the function of 
each and should resolve the confusion about the relationship between the two remedies. 
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conditions of confinement and damages, provisions currently ac-
commodated by section 1983. Such a reform would preserve 
principles of comity and federalism by ensuring the states' op-
portunity to correct constitutional violations through the ex-
haustion of state remedies requirement. Establishing habeas 
corpus as state prisoners' exclusive remedy could thereby elimi-
nate the current confusion between habeas corpus and section 
1983 actions without compromising individual rights. 
Until Congress definitively addresses this issue, however, 
defining the scope of habeas will remain in the exclusive prov-
ince of the Supreme Court. 
B. TEAGUE V. LANE: A SWORD AND A SHIELD 
Harris' attorneys denied the State's assertions that his sec-
tion 1983 class action was really a petition for habeas corpus.2311 
Yet at the eleventh hour, he converted his section 1983 class ac-
tion lawsuit into a habeas petition.236 After reading Justice Ste-
vens' dissent to the Supreme Court's opinion vacating Harris' 
second and third stays,237 Harris' incentive for this conversion 
becomes patently clear.238 
Asserting his claim as a habeas petition allowed Harris to 
rely on Teague v. Lane239 as both a sword and a shield, enabling 
him to simultaneously complain the McCleskey240 standard 
should not be retroactively applied to his case while invoking the 
235. Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
236. At Harris' request, the section 1983 action was converted into his sixth federal 
habeas petition. No. C-92-1482-MHP (N.D. Cal.); No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.). 
237. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653-56 (1992) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
238. Justice Stevens wrote, "if execution by cyanide gas is in fact unconstitutional, 
then the State lacks the power to impose such punishment. Harris' delay, even if unjusti-
fied, cannot endow the State with the authority to violate the Constitution. It was this 
principle ... that a plurality of this Court embraced in Teague v. Lane." Gomez, 112 S. 
Ct. at 1656. 
Notably, Justice Stevens' dissent invoked the protection of Teague while Harris' 
lawsuit was still a section 1983 action and not a habeas petition. See generally Appendix 
for the sequence of events. 
239. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (petitioner cannot invoke a "new" rule of law in support. of 
habeas relief except in exceptional circumstances). 
240. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
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protection of Weems v. United States241 against his execution 
by lethal gas.242 . 
1. Teague as a Sword 
Harris contended that his lawsuit became ripe only after 
April 5, 1992.243 He asserted that there was an evolving constitu-
tional standard as to what constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment,244 and that the most recent standard should be applied to 
his case.2411 
If indeed execution by lethal gas constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, then Harris' 
claim would fall within one of the exceptions of Teague, i.e., 
"certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."246 
Therefore, it is arguable that the new rule as to what constitutes 
241. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (holding that the standard for deciding what consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment is not set by what the prevailing norm was in 1789, 
but rather by an evolving adaptation to new evils). 
242. This was not the first time Harris relied on Teague. Harris' third habeas peti-
tion claimed that the psychiatric assistance provided to him at the penalty phase of his 
trial was incompetent and thereby violated the rule of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 
(1985), a case decided three years after Harris' second petition was filed. Harris v. Vas-
quez, 901 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1990). Ninth Circuit Judge Noonan found that Harris 
had not abused the writ of habeas corpus because Ake was both a fundamental rule and 
was unavailable at the time of Harris' previous petitions. [d. at 726-27. However, under 
Teague, the novelty of Ake rendered the case nonretroactive unless it fell within a 
Teague exception. Judge Noonan held that a reasonable jurist could conclude that the 
Ake rule fell within the second Teague exception (new rules "without which the likeli-
hood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished," Teague, 489 U.S. at 313) be-
cause Ake was based on considerations of fundamental fairness and enhanced the accu-
racy of the jury's conclusions. Therefore, Judge Noonan concluded that a colorable 
argument could be made that the rule would be applied retroactively, despite its novelty. 
Harris, 901 F.2d at 726-27. Harris' claims were ultimately barred because he had raised 
similar issues in prior petitions. Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 618 (9th Cir. 1990). 
243. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. 
244. Ha~ris' argument had been tried and failed before. In 1983, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied convicted murderer Eddie Lucas an evidentiary hearing on his 
claim that death by cyanide gas was cruel and unusual. Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 
(5th Cir. 1983). At that time, only three members of the Supreme Court felt the issue of 
the method of execution raised sufficiently serious questions under the eighth amend-
ment to merit review by writ of certiorari. See Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983). 
245. See Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
246. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (the other exception is for new rules "without 
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished."). 
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cruel and unusual punishment should be applied retroactively to 
Harris' case despite the fact that this was not the constitutional 
standard that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took 
place.247 
By using Teague to assert his right to apply a new constitu-
tional standard retroactively, Harris used the case as a sword. 
Harris argued that if execution by lethal gas was in fact uncon-
stitutional, then the State lacked the power to impose such a 
punishment. However, this reading of Teague interprets a "new 
rule" very narrowly and interprets the "exceptions" very 
broadly. Such an interpretation contravenes the Court's intent. 
For example, in Butler v. McKellar,248 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote that if at the time a defendant's conviction became final 
the applicability of a particular rule of criminal procedure "was 
susceptible to debate among reasonable minds," as evidenced by 
a split of authority among lower courts, then the state court 
"reasonably" could have decided the issue either way.249 In such 
a case, according to the Butler Court, a habeas court may not set 
aside the defendant's conviction based on the state court's reso-
lution of the issue in dispute.2l!o 
Because the issue of whether death by lethal gas constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment is "susceptible to debate among 
reasonable minds," and because at the time Harris' conviction 
became final, the state court "reasonably" could have decided 
the issue either way, it would have been inappropriate for the 
Supreme Court to set aside Harris' sentence on that basis. 
2. Teague as a Shield 
Harris also attempted to use Teague to shield his constitu-
tional challenge from the strict scrutiny enunciated in McCles-
247. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(When the challenged conduct falls clearly beyond the State's legitimate power, "[tlhere 
is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it 
ought properly never to repose."). See also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) 
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("Review on habeas to determine that the convic-
tion rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the time of the conviction is all 
that is required to force trial and appellate courts ... to toe the constitutional mark."). 
248. 494 U.S. 407 (1990). 
249. [d. at 415. 
250. [d. 
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key v. Zant. 21S1 The Court in Teague adopted Justice Harlan's 
reasoning that "[g]iven the 'broad scope of constitutional issues 
cognizable on habeas, it is sounder, in adjudicating habeas peti-
tions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a convic-
tion became final than it is to dispose of [habeas] cases on the 
basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.' "21S2 
Because McCleskey itself constituted a change in the consti-
tutional interpretation of the right to habeas review, its applica-
tion was arguably inappropriate to Harris' case, and therefore 
could not bar his habeas petition. At the time Harris' case was 
decided, no rigid "abuse of the writ" doctrine existed. Thus, it is 
arguable under Teague that individuals who were convicted and 
whose cases arose for habeas review prior to 1991 should not 
subsequently be denied relief on the basis of new rules which 
restrict the scope of habeas review. 
By asserting his right to raise a constitutional issue not 
raised in prior habeas petitions, Harris attempted to use Teague 
to shield him from the Court's "abuse of the writ" standard 
enunciated in McCleskey.21S3 However, the Supreme Court held 
that the McCleskey standard was applicable to Harris' case.m 
This is undoubtedly because under the definition enunciated in 
Butler,21S1S the McCleskey decision did not create a new rule 
within the meaning of Teague, and thus could appropriately be 
applied to the pending case if it were indeed a habeas action.21S6 
The Harris case demonstrates that the retroactivity test cre-
ated in Teague could virtually eliminate retroactive rules from 
habeas corpus cases. Taken together, the expanded new rule def-
inition and the extremely limited exceptions to non-retroactivity 
will greatly reduce the chances that defendants receive the bene-
fit of new rules of criminal procedure on habeas corpus review. 
251. 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991). 
252. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689 
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
253. 111 S. Ct. at 1470. 
254. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (holding 
that if Harris' claim was indeed a habeas petition, it would be barred by McCleskey). 
255. 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990). 
256. Because at the time of their decision Harris' suit was still a section 1983 action, 
the Supreme Court did not base their ruling to overturn Harris' stays on McCleskey. 
Gomez, 112 S. Ct. at 1653. 
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In general, this result will comport with the widely desirable 
goal of reducing the total amount of habeas litigation. However, 
it would be advisable to expand Teague to provide a mechanism 
for judges to respond to accuracy concerns in individual cases 
rather than determining retroactivity on a strictly categorical 
basis. 
Such a modification would promote the important values'of 
federalism and comity by curbing erosion of the finality of state 
criminal convictions, without limiting the "great writ's" ability 
to perform its noble and historic purpose. 
C. INTERVENTION BY THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court's decision to bar further stays "except 
upon order of this Court"21!7 is perhaps the most controversial 
issue in the Harris case. In a recent Yale Law Journal article, 
Professors Calabresi and Lawson considered the proper relation-
ship between the Supreme Court and the inferior federal 
courts. 2M They concluded that the Court had no authority to is-
sue such an order. 21!9 
But Attorney General Dan Lungren has stated that the Su-
preme Court may have been relying upon one or more of several 
factors. 26o First, the Court may have invoked the All Writs Act261 
or its inherent "supervisory power"262 to protect the integrity of 
. the proceedings and its ability to hear any subsequent motions 
after the Ninth Circuit office had shut down for the night.263 
Second, the Harris case involved certain extraordinary circum-
stances which rendered it unique in comparison to other death 
257. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (1992). 
258. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 6, at 271; see also Caminker & Chemerinsky, 
supra note 6, at 246-52. 
259. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 6, at 271. 
260. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988). 
262. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (establishing the 
Supreme Court's supervisory authority as an independent basis for decision); United 
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (a more recent exercise of the Supreme Court's 
supervisory powers); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 756 n.22 (1979) (the Su-
preme Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers, though acknowledging their 
force). 
263. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
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penalty cases.264 A closer examination of the details of that eve-
ning suggests there is credence to these arguments. 
1. Inherent Supervisory Power 
The Supreme Court has relied on its "supervisory authority 
over the administration of criminal justice in the federal 
courts"2611 as an independent basis for decision for over 50 
years.266 The Court's opinion in McNabb v. United States was 
expressly grounded on the Supreme Court's "limited function as 
the court of ultimate review of the standards formulated and ap-
plied by federal courts in the trial of criminal cases."267 
Although several cases have suggested that the Court's su-
pervisory power derives from the All Writs Act,268 the consensus 
appears to be that it is an implied or inherent power.269 One of 
the justifications most commonly offered for the latter conclu-
sion is that the judiciary must necessarily have the authority to 
protect its own integrity in order to carry out its functions. 27o 
The supervisory power is often exercised to prevent or cor-
rect injustice where existing procedures have proved inade-
quate.271 In many cases, the problem could have been solved 
264. [d.; see also infra notes 326-36 and accompanying text, detailing the circuitous 
path of Harris' 14 years of legal maneuverings, as well as questionable conduct by his 
attorneys in the final hours preceding his execution. 
265. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943). 
266. [d. Concluding in McNabb that "(jJudicial supervision of the administration of 
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining 
civilized standards of procedure and evidence," the Court excluded a defendant's confes-
sion because it was the product of prolonged illegal detention. [d. at 340, 347. 
267. [d. at 347. 
268. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957) (discussing 
the "supervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeal" under the All 
Writs Act). 
269. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Con-
stitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1433, 1468-69 (1984). 
270. See Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
1656, 1663 (1963) (asserting that the judiciary's right to keep its own skirts clean is the 
"most acceptable rationale" for McNabb); Note, A Separation of Powers Approach to 
the Supervisory Power of Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L.REv. 427 (1982) (discussing the 
fact that the "judicial integrity rationale ... does point to a proper base" for supervisory 
power). 
271. See The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 
1050, 1978 (1965). 
37
Cox: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
192 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:155 
without resort to the Court's supervisory power but frequently 
only by distorting traditional legal doctrines.272 
The events of Harris' final hours illuminated several short-
comings in the sufficiency of existing Ninth Circuit procedures 
to prevent injustice. Arguably, these events merited the Su-
preme Court's intervention. 
In an address delivered by Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt273 at Yale Law School on April 25, 1992,274 Judge 
Reinhardt noted that Ninth Circuit judges are scattered over the 
entire western part of the United States, and that it was difficult 
for the judges to communicate quickly and effectively among 
themselves on the evening of April 21.2711 These logistical diffi-
culties, he explained, were compounded by a malfunction in the 
electronic mail system which resulted in some judges not receiv-
ing all communications, and others receiving communications 
only after the time for voting had passed.276 
According to newspaper accounts, some judges said they 
were confused about which issue they were voting on, and at 
least one said he was never even contacted even though he was 
at home.277 Several judges said they were unaware that stays had 
been ordered.27s Others said they went to bed thinking the exe-
cution had been stayed, only to wake up in the morning and 
learn from television that Harris had been executed.279 
"There simply was not sufficient time for the regular pro-
272. 1d. 
273. Judge Reinhardt was one of the ten judges who voted to grant the second stay 
in the Harris case. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, No. 92-70237 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 
1992) (Canby, Fletcher, Hug, D.W. Nelson, T.G. Nelson, Noonan, Norris, Poole, Preger-
son, Reinhardt, J.J.) (second stay). 
274. See Reinhardt, supra note 6. 
275. 1d. at 209. 
276. 1d. "So voluminous was the flurry of after-hour communications that chaos 
reigned through the night as the computer system of the far-flung Ninth Circuit got 
hopelessly bogged down and the judges argued over long distance phone lines about Har-
ris' fate." Richard C. Paddock & Henry Weinstein, Appeal Judges Maneuvered Amid 
Chaos, LA TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at AI. 
277. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 276, at AI. 
278. 1d. 
279. 1d. "I walked in this morning quite surprised that the execution took place 
without our being informed," one judge said. 1d. 
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cess to work in an orderly manner."280 Thus, on Monday eve-
ning, while a group of ten Ninth Circuit judges entered an order 
staying the execution, another judge simultaneously led an effort 
to obtain the votes of a majority of the court to override the 
panel's interpretation of the habeas rules.281 One of the conse-
quences of the chaos was that the third stay issued by a single 
judge on Monday evening was "of absolutely no practical signifi-
cance,"282 and "duplicated the one that had already been issued 
by the ten judges of th~ court. "288 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit clerk's office shut down af-
ter the third stay of the night was vacated.284 This made it diffi-
cult to quickly verify subsequent orders received from the Ninth 
Circuit.28G 
Finally, at 3:51 a.m., after Harris had already been strapped 
into the electric chair, Judge Harry Pregerson, who had already 
participated in the second stay,28S issued a fourth stay.287 Judge 
Reinhardt suggested that Judge Pregerson had not had the op-
portunity to review any of the orders issued by the Supreme 
Court before he issued the fourth stay.288 Judge Reinhardt sug-
280. Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 211. 
281. [d. 
282. [d. (citing Gomez v. Vasquez, No. 92-55426 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 1992) (third 
stay». 
283. Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 211 (citing Gomez v. Vasquez, No. 92-70237 (9th 
Cir. Apr. 20, 1992) (second stay». 
284. See Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. Attorney General Lungren has stated his office 
was unable to reach anyone in the clerk's office or with the court. [d. 
The closing of the clerk's office was verified by a Ninth Court staff member, who 
stated she closed the clerk's office at 3:30 a.m. Telephone Interview with Jeri Curtis, 
Senior Deputy in Charge of Operations for the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 21, 1993). 
285. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
286. Gomez v. Vasquez, No. 92-70237 (9th Cir. Ari. 20, 1992) (second stay). The 
second stay had been lifted by the Supreme Court at 3 a.m. Gomez v. United States Dist. 
Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992). 
287. Harris v. Vasquez, No. 92-70237 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 1992) (fourth stay). At Har-
ris' request, the section 1983 action was converted into his sixth federal habeas petition. 
No. C-92-1482-MHP (N.D. Cal.); No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.). Thus, the fourth stay was is-
sued based on the habeas petition. [d. 
Pregerson has taken similar action before. In June 1990, he granted a stay of execu-
tion to Thomas Baal just 90 minutes before Baal was scheduled to die by lethal injection 
in Nevada. The stay was overturned by the Supreme Court and Baal was put to death on 
June 3, 1990. Harriet Chiang, Judge Explains Stay of Execution, S.F. CHRON., May 18, 
1992, at A13. 
288. Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 213. Apparently, however, the Ninth Circuit clerk's 
office was in contact with Judge Pregerson's staff throughout the evening of Harris' exe-
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gested further that Judge Pregerson may have assumed, after 
learning of the Supreme Court's decision to vacate the second 
stay289 that the Justices had agreed with the panel's ruling that 
Harris was in the wrong court.290 If that were the case, Judge 
Reinhardt reasoned, Judge Pregerson's order would have given 
Harris' attorneys time to go to the proper court for a hearing on 
the cruel and unusual punishment issue.291 
In fact, however, the Supreme Court had already ruled on 
the cruel and unusual punishment issue.292 The Court had 
weighed the equities and determined that California's "strong 
interest in proceeding with its judgment" was strengthened by 
the fact that, regardless of whether Harris' suit was character-
ized as a habeas corpus petition or a new civil suit, he could 
have brought the claim more than a decade ago.293 Thus, Judge 
Pregerson's stay was duplicative and inappropriate.294 
Judge Robert Bork characterized the multiple stays issued 
by Ninth Circuit judges as a case of judicial civil disobedience.29Ci 
"Those judges who, after years of judicial examination and re-
examination of the conviction, repeatedly issued last-minute 
stays of execution evidently thought their personal opposition to 
capital punishment was reason enough to defy what law and 
cution. Telephone Interview with Jeri Curtis, Senior Deputy in Charge of Operations for 
the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 21, 1993). 
Moreover, because Pregerson was a participant in the second stay, it was arguably 
incumbent upon him to inquire into the Supreme Court's reasoning in denying the sec-
ond stay before issuing a fourth stay. 
289. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam) 
(vacating second, and third stays) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
290. Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 213. 
291. Id. 
292. Gomez, 112 S. Ct. at 1653. 
293. Id. 
294. Ironically, Judge Pregerson's stay, ostensibly aimed at avoiding cruel and un-
usual punishment, had the ultimate effect of imposing that which it sought to avert, to 
wit, Harris' reported mental anguish at having to face death twice, once around 4 a.m., 
when he was removed from the gas chamber just moments from death, and then again 
around 6 a.m., when his execution finally took place. This was the first time in San 
Quentin history that a prisoner was taken from the gas chamber alive. Richard C. Pad-
dock, 9th Circuit Judge Criticizes High Court Over Execution, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
1993, at AI. 
295. Bork, supra note 9. Professors Caminker and Chemerinsky, who have labelled 
Harris' execution "lawless," nevertheless concede that Judge Pregerson's actions may 
have "reasonably foreshadowed a pattern of continuous defiance." Caminker and 
Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 249. 
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their judicial superiors demanded. "296 
Even if the stays were meritorious, their issuance by mem-
bers of the Ninth Circuit rested on questionable legal footing, 
according to California Attorney General Dan Lungren.297 The 
mandate of the Ninth Circuit panel, preceding the four stays, 
had issued immediately, and under Ninth Circuit rules, individ-
ual members of the court cannot stay an execution after such an 
action, unless the mandate has been recalled (which it was 
not).298 Moreover, although two of the first three stay requests 
were based upon the section 1983 action, the stay orders were 
based upon special rules for habeas corpus actions.299 Conse-
quently, there was no direct authority supporting the four 
stays.300 
Given (1) the inability of the Ninth Circuit to effectively 
communicate within its ranks, (2) the apparent closing of the 
Ninth Circuit clerk's office after the third stay was vacated, (3) 
the invalid issuance of two successive stays, and (4) the ques-
tionable legal footing of all four stays, the Supreme Court was 
certainly justified in exercising its supervisory power over the 
administration of justice in the federal courts. 
2. The All Writs Act 
Contrary to popular media interpretation, the Supreme 
Court's language barring further stays "except upon order of 
this Court" should not be read as barring all further stays.301 
Rather, it expressly acknowledged the potential for requests for 
additional stays, so long as such requests were made directly to 
the Supreme Court.302 This was an act by the Supreme Court to 
retain its jurisdiction over the case and to enjoin parallel pro-
ceedings. Such a ruling was entirely within the Supreme Court's 
296. Bork, supra note 9. 
297. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
298. [d.; see also 9TH CIR. R. 22-5. 
299. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4; see also 9TH CIR. R. 22-2. 
300. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
301. Professors Caminker and Chemerinksy asserted that "[t]he prospective injunc-
tion barred issuance of a stay on any legal grounds whatsoever . . . . " Caminker & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 246. 
302. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
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powers under the All Writs Act.303 
The broad language of the All Writs Act has been strength-
ened by case law outlining situations where issuing writs of man-
damus in aid of jurisdiction is appropriate.304 Notably, in a 1990 
case,3011 a New York district court held that one of the situations 
in which intercourt injunctions under the All Writs Act are 
proper is "enjoining repeated, baseless, vexatious litigation by 
the same plaintiff in a federal court."306 In Cinel u. Connick,307 
the federal district court clarified this vexatious litigation situa-
tion further, holding that "any order under the [All Writs] Act 
must be directed at conduct which, if left unchecked, would 
have had the practical effe~t of diminishing the court's power to 
bring the litigation to a natural conclusion. "308 
303. The statute reads as follows: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by 
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) 
(1988). 
304. See LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957) ("[tJhe question of 
naked power has long been settled by this Court"); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Asso'n, 
319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) ("the traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction 
both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a 
lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction"); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 
346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (the writ is appropriately issued when there is "usurpation of 
judicial power" or a clear abuse of discretion). 
305. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 728 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990). 
306. [d. at 1043; see Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 23-24 (2nd Cir. 
1986). Additional situations include: 
(1) enjoining state actions when necessary to prevent relitigation of an existing fed-
eral judgment. Teamsters, 728 F. Supp. at 1043 (quoting In re Baldwin-United Corp., 
770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985) and citing United States v. New York Telephone, 434 
U.S. 159, 172 (1977»; 
(2) preventing a state court from interfering with a federal court's consideration of 
disposition of a case so "as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority 
to decide that case." Teamsters, 728 F. Supp. at 1043 (citing Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d 
at 335 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line RR Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 
281, 295 (1970»); 
(3) "enjoining a state court seeking to entertain an action over the same res; and in 
an in rem action, when the parallel state action will defeat the already attached jurisdic-
tion of the federal court." Teamsters, 728 F. Supp. at 1043 (quoting Baldwin-United, 
770 F.2d at 336, citing Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922), and 
comparing Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977»; and 
(4) in certain actions involving parallel actions in foreign courts. Teamsters, 728 F. 
Supp. at 1043 (citing Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 926-34 (D.C. Cir. 1984». 
307. 792 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. La. 1992). 
308. [d. at 497 (quoting ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 
(5th Cir. 1978». 
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As previously noted, due to early morning confusion within 
the Ninth Circuit, duplicative second and third stays had al-
ready been issued.809 Furthermore, Judge Pregerson's fourth 
stay was based on his misconception (or disregard) of the basis 
upon which the Supreme Court lifted a prior stay. At a mini-
mum, the third and fourth stays qualify as repeated and 
baseless. 
Also as previously noted, the Ninth Circuit clerk's office 
shut down after the third stay of the night was vacated.810 Real-
izing this, the Supreme Court may well have determined it was 
necessary in its final order to retain its jurisdiction over the case 
conditionally, while expressly preserving the possibility for fur-
ther requests for stay.311 
Finally, all of the activity surrounding Harris' execution oc-
curred against a backdrop of traditional tension between the 
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court over the death penalty.312 
The appeals court and the Supreme Court have battled in the 
past over the pace of capital cases.818 Despite scores of Supreme 
Court rulings since 1976 upholding the death penalty and re-
stricting grounds for appeal, the Ninth Circuit had successfully 
blocked executions throughout the West until an April, 1992 ex-
ecution in Arizona.314 As recently as January, 1992, the Justices 
309. See supra notes 275-83 and accompanying text. 
310. See supra note 284. 
311. See Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
312. "The Supreme Court may perceive the Ninth Circuit as a special problem in 
[death penalty cases]," observed former Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Andrew Frey. 
"That isn't to say either side is right. It's just that the Ninth Circuit has always been a 
different animal." Richard C. Paddock & Henry Weinstein, Appeal Judges Maneuvered 
Amid Chaos, LA TIMES, April 22, 1992, at AI. 
313. Id. 
314. Don Eugene Harding was executed in Arizona on April 6, 1992. Howard Mintz 
and Richard Barbieri, Will Ninth Circuit Fall in Line?, THE RECORDER, Apr. 22, 1992, at 
1. A breakdown, by state, of the executions carried out since· the 1976 U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling allowing states to resume use of the death penalty clearly demonstrates the 
ninth circuit's reluctance to do so. In all, 188 men and one woman have been executed in 
21 different states since 1976. Only eight of those are in the Ninth Circuit. (Thirty-eight 
states, including four states within the Ninth Circuit, have death-penalty statutes.) John 
K. Wiley, Execution of Triple Murderer Is First By Hanging Since 1965, S.F. CHRON., 
Jan. 6, 1993, at A15. 
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issued a sharp rebuke to the Ninth Circuit for delaying action on 
a pending death penalty case from the state of Washington for 
more than two years.Slll The skirmish which took place the Mon-
day evening before Harris' execution, however, was much more 
"severe. "S16 
In the wake of the Harris execution, and at the behest of 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Ninth Circuit317 has proposed 
curbs on last-minute stays of execution. Their action is 
"designed to avoid the confusing flurry of court actions that 
delayed the execution of Robert Alton Harris."3l8 Among the 
proposed changes is the elimination of a rule that allows any 
judge on the 28-member court to stop an execution.319 
It is certainly arguable that the frenzy of last-minute stays 
were "intended to subvert the rule of law as established by a 
higher court."320 According to newspaper accounts, one Ninth 
Circuit judge said the Supreme Court was well within its 
bounds.32l The Supreme Court was simply enjoining the Ninth 
Circuit from continuing to defy the high Court's orders against 
staying Harris' execution on the basis of his lethal gas claim, ac-
cording to the judge.322 
Washington: 1 (1/5/93) Georgia: 15 Alabama: 10 
Nevada: 5 Missouri: 7 Arkansas: 4 
North Carolina: 5 Utah: 4 
South Carolina: 4 Oklahoma: 3 
Mississippi: 4 Indiana: 2 
Illinois: 1 Wyoming: 1 
Delaware: 1 
315. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 182, at AI. 
316. Id. 
317. This court is the largest federal appeals court in the United States. Harriet 
Chiang, Court Plans to Limit Execution Appeals, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1992, at A14. 
318. Id. 
319. 9TH CIR. R. 22-5(e)(4). 
320. Requiem for A Murderer, supra note 9. One Ninth Circuit judge, who spoke on 
the condition of anonymity, said, "There was never much question that the Ninth Cir-
cuit judges would lose and that Harris would eventually be executed." But he added: 
"Everybody does what they have to do .... You feel, just maybe, there will be enough 
people on the high court who will see it your way." Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 
182, at AI. 
321. Lisa Stansky, High Court's Power Debated In Harris Case, THE RECORDER, 
April 28, 1992, at 1. "I find it astonishing that anyone would question the power of the 
Supreme Court of the United States to enforce its own judgments and enforce its or-
ders," said the judge, who asked to remain nameless. Id. 
322. Id. "The court did the only thing it could do in the face of naked defiance of its 
orders," the judge said. Id. 
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Contrary to the conclusion reached by Professors Caminker 
and Chemerinsky,328 had Harris' close brush with death at 3:51 
a.m. prompted his brother, out of crystallized feelings of guilt, to 
reveal exculpatory information about Harris' role in his criminal 
activity, Harris' attorneys could have contacted the Supreme 
Court directly.8u 
Thus, even if the rather "nebulous inherent supervisory 
powers"8211 of the Suprem:e Court were insufficient to confer ju-
risdiction upori the Supreme Court for its decision to issue the 
injunction against further stays, the Supreme Court's action was 
an appropriate assertion of its statutory jurisdiction under the 
All Writs Act, and was intended to bring the Harris litigation to 
a natural and just conclusion. 
Kent Scheidegger, legal director of the pro-death penalty group Criminal Justice 
Legal Foundation in Sacramento, believes that the "Ninth Circuit went berserk." Schei-
degger singled out Judge Pregerson for special criticism, saying it was clear from the 
Supreme Courrs second order that it considered the eighth amendment claim to be too 
late, whether raised in a civil or habeas case. The judge, in Scheidegger's view, disre-
garded the Supreme Court's clear and controlling precedent when he issued the fourth 
stay. Reske, supra note 7, at 26. 
California Governor Pete Wilson issued a scathing press release after Harris' execu-
tion in which he criticized Judge Pregerson and his colleagues for issuing four stays of 
execution. "The behavior of individual judges of the Ninth Circuit has excited new 
meaning for the phrase 'contempt of court,''' Wilson said. Chiang, supra note 188, at 
A13. 
The California Senate Judiciary Committee, in an effort to reduce court challenges 
of death penalties, voted on June 9, 1992 to give condemned prisoners a choice between 
lethal injection and the gas chamber. "Adding the alternative [of lethal injection) in my 
opinion minimizes the probability of any such challenge [that killing inmates in the 
state's gas chamber is ud'constitutionally cruel and unusual punishment) being vali-
dated," according to Sen. Quentin Kopp, the author of the measure. Lethal-Injection 
Bills Approved by Senate Panel, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at B8. 
323. See Caminker & Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 246. 
324. It is doubtful what effect even such an exculpatory revelation would have had 
at this late juncture. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (exculpatory informa-
tion held irrelevant in the face of proper proceedings at state court level). C{. Stephen J. 
Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet 
Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988) (maintaining there is no credible evidence that any-
one who was not guilty has been executed as a result of capital punishment). 
Moreover, Harris had already made the claim that his brother shot one of the two 
San Diego teenagers. The claim was most recently rejected by United States District 
Judge Howard B. Turrentine on Friday, April 17. "If that [the claim) was true," Turren-
tine said, "it would have been discovered a long time ago." Philip Hager & Richard C. 
Paddock, Harris Execution Delayed by Judge, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1992, at AI. 
325. See Caminker & Chemerinsky; supra note 6, at 247. 
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3. Extraordinary Circumstances 
In addition to the procedural and logistical difficulties 
which justified the Supreme Court's final injunction against fur-
ther stays, the Harris case involved several extraordinary cir-
cumstances which rendered it unique.826 
First, despite the Ninth Circuit's documented reluctance 
to execute death penalty convictions, few cases have traveled 
Harris' circuitous path. His legal maneuvers included a total of 
six federal habeas petitions and ten state habeas petitions over a 
14-year period.81l7 Yet there was never any real dispute over his 
guilt, or over the depravity of his crimes.81l8 
Second, the flurry of activity in the week prior to Harris' 
execution was unprecedented. On April 17, just four days before 
his scheduled execution, and after his case had already received 
eleven separate reviews,81l9 Harris filed three new lawsuits, in-
cluding a federal class action.880 Oral arguments, written briefs, 
and hurried decisions commandeered the Easter holiday week-
end. Attorneys were forced to await written opinions before be-
ing able to respond to oral mandates issued hours earlier.881 The 
frenzy continued up until just 20 minutes before Harris' execu-
tion, when it was ended by the Supreme Court's final ruling. 8811 
Finally, as the inevitability of Harris' execution became ap-
parent, his attorneys telephoned Judge Harry Pregerson at home 
and communicated an urgent final appeal on an ex parte basis. 
Had the State's attorneys been contacted or included in the 
early morning phone call with Pregerson, the fourth appeal may 
well never have issued.888 Such conduct approximates forum 
326. See Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
327. See generally Appendix. . 
328. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text, detailing seven separate confes-
sions by Harris. 
329. See Appendix, pp. 203-08. 
330. See Appendix, p. 209. 
331. See, e.g., supra note 177. 
332. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992). 
333. The State's attorneys were aware of the basis for the Supreme Court's decision 
to vacate the second stay. Had Judge Pregerson consulted with them, he would have 
been informed that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment issue, and that a successive stay on that issue would be duplicative. Lungren, 
46
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/15
1993] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 201 
shopping and undermines the importance of the adversarial pro-
cess.3U It was in the wake of Judge Pregerson's resultant stay 
that the Supreme Court responded with resounding finality.3311 
The alternative was to rely on a Ninth Circuit court that had 
seemed to collapse under the pressure of the Harris case and 
was being abused by Harris' lawyers.338 
The sum of these unusual circumstances, while not forming 
any independent legal basis for the Supreme Court's action, 
should certainly be factored into an evaluation of its propriety. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The off-again, on-again execution of Robert Alton Harris 
represented everything that advocates on both sides of the issue 
say is wrong with the death penalty in America. Death penalty 
proponents and opponents, albeit for different reasons, agreed 
that what went on in the last hours before the cyanide tablets 
were dropped into an acid solution was both wrong and 
typical. 387 
Judge Robert Bork observed that Harris could never have 
been executed, even after multiple future hearings, without an-
other battle against the clock.838 One has only to look to other 
states where executions have recently been carried out to realize 
the truth of his words.889 The Supreme Court's action to end the 
excruciating series of last-minute stays, one of which came while 
Harris was strapped into the gas chamber chair, was both justi-
fied and merciful. 
Henry Thoreau once wrote, "I do not lend myself to the 
supra note 9, at 4. 
334. [d. 
335. Vasquez, 112 S. Ct. at 1714. 
336. Lungren, supra note 9, at 4. 
337. Henry J. Reske, Courts Battle over Harris Execution, 78-Jul. A.B.A.J. 26 
(1992). 
338. [d. 
339. See, e.g., Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919 (1988) (28 appeals to date in highly 
publicized hi-fi murder case); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (Virginia 
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wrong which I condemn. "340 Yet as philosopher Peter Singer 
wisely pointed out, those who think they must disobey demo-
cratic laws in order to avoid acquiescing, or seeming to acqui-
esce, in particular results of the democratic system are mistaken: 
their actions are really indicative of a refusal to acquiesce in the 
democratic system itself.341 
Deirdre J. Cox * 
340. Henry D. Thoreau, ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849) at 36. 
341. Peter Singer, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE (1973) at 102. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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APPENDIX 







Robert Alton Harris (on parole for a voluntary 
manslaughter conviction) and his brother 
Daniel are arrested as suspects in the kidnap 
and murder of two 16-year-old boys, Michael 
Baker and John Mayeski. Baker's father is 
one of the officers who capture Harris. 
Robert Alton Harris is convicted by a jury (in 
a bifurcated trial) of two counts of murder (as 
well as kidnapping, robbery, receiving stolen 
property, and possession of concealable fire-
arms by an ex-felon). Superior Court Judge 
Eli Levenson denies Harris' motions for a new 
trial. No. CR 44135 (Super. Ct., S.D. County). 
Superior Court Judge Eli Levenson sentences 
Harris to death. No. CR 44135 (Super. Ct. 
S.D. County). 
California Supreme Court affirms Harris' con-
viction on direct appeal, and simultaneously 
denies his first state petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240 
(1981). No. CR 20888 (Cal.). (This is the same 
state supreme court that, under the guidance 
of Chief Justice Rose Bird, overturned 64 out 
of 68 death sentences prior to 1986. Harris' 
was one of the four the Bird court let stand.2 ) 
Superior Court sets execution date of July 7, 
1981. No. CR 44135 (Super. Ct. S.D. County). 
1. This chronology was compiled from relevant decisions and: Alan Abrahamson, 
Harris Execution Set for April 21, LA TIMES, March 14, 1992, at A24; Richard Barbieri, 
Harris' Last 15 Hours, THE RECORDER, April 20, 1992, at 14; Daniel E. Lungren & Mark 
L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 
295, 315-26 (1992). They are credited accordingly. 
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California Supreme Court stays the July 7, 
1981 execution pending Harris' appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court. No. CR 44135 
(Super. Ct. S.D. County). 
United States Supreme Court denies certio-
rari, thereby affirming Harris' death sentence. 
Harris v. California, 454 U.S. 882 (1981). No. 
80-6702 (U.S.). 
Superior Court sets new execution date of De-
cember 15, 1981. No. CR 44135 (Super. Ct. 
S.D. County). 
Judge Don Smith denies Harris' second state 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. No. HC 
5841 (Super. Ct. S.D. County). 
California Court of Appeal denies Harris' 
third state petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. No. CR 13691 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.). 
California Supreme Court grants another stay 
of execution to provide time for the court to 
rule on Harris' petition for a new trial. No. CR 
22380 (Cal.). . 
California Supreme Court denies Harris' 
fourth state petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, refusing to overturn his conviction. 
No. CR 22380 (Cal.). 
Superior Court sets execution date of March 
16, 1982. No. CR 44135 (Super. Ct. S.D. 
County). 
United States District Judge William Enright 
denies Harris' first federal petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. No. 82-0249-E (S.D. Cal.). 
Ninth Circuit issues a stay of execution pend-
ing Harris' appeal of the denial of his first fed-
eral habeas corpus petition. Harris argues that 
the state's death penalty law is unconstitu-
tional because it discriminates against men. 
t No. 82-5246 (9th Cir.). 
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Superior Court Judge James Malkus denies 
Harris' fifth state petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. No. HC 6063 (Super. Ct. S.d. County). 
California Court of Appeal denies Harris' 
sixth state petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. No. CR 13922 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.). 
United States Supreme Court denies certio-
rari with regard to Harris' fourth state habeas 
petition. Harris v. California, 457 U.S. 1111 
(1982). No. 81-6512 (U.S.). 
California Supreme Court denies Harris' sev-
enth state petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
No. CR 22612 (Cal.). 
Ninth Circuit (in response to Harris' appeal of 
the denial of his first federal habeas petition) 
remands Harris' case to the state courts with 
an order that they conduct a proportionality 
review. This decision has the effect of indefi-
nitely blocking any executions. Harris v. Pul-
ley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982). No. 82-5246 
(9th Cir.). 
Ninth Circuit denies Harris' petition for re-
hearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc 
(relating to their 9/16/82 decision), and 
amends opinion 692 F.2d 1189. No. 82-5246 
(9th Cir.). 
United States Supreme Court grants the At-
torney General's petition for writ of certiorari 
from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harris' 
first federal appeal, and grants leave for Har-
ris to proceed in forma pauperis. Pulley v. 
Harris, 460 U.S. 1036 (1983). No. 82-1095 
(U.S.). 
United States Supreme Court denies certio-
rari with regard to Harris' cross-petition for 
writ of certiorari from the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Harris' first federal appeal. Harris v. 
Pulley, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). No. 82-6019 (U.S.). 
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United States Supreme Court reverses Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Harris' first federal ap-
peal, holding a proportionality review is un-
necessary. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). No. 82-1095 (U.S.). 
Ninth Circuit remands to United States Dis-
trict Court in light of United States Supreme' 
Court reversal. Harris v. Pulley, 726 F.2d 569 
(9th Cir. 1984). No. 82-5246 (9th Cir.). 
United States District Judge William Enright 
denies Harris' second federal petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. No. 82-1005-E (S.D. 
Cal.). 
United States District Judge Enright denies 
issues remaining from Ninth Circuit remand 
on first federal habeas. No. 82-0249-E (S.D. 
Cal.). 
Ninth Circuit affirms district court's denial of 
Harris' second federal petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Harris v. Pulley, 852 F.2d 1546 
(9th Cir. 1988). No. 84-6433 (9th Cir.). 
Ninth Circuit denies Harris' petition for re-
hearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc 
(relating to their 7/8/88 decision), and super-
sedes opinion 852 F.2d 1546. Harris v. Pulley, 
885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988). No. 84-6433 
(9th Cir.). 
United States Supreme Court denies certio-
rari with regard to Harris' second federal peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. Harris v. Pul-
ley, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting.). No. 89-767 (U.S.). 
Superior Court sets Harris' fourth execution 
date for April 3, 1990. No. CR 44135 (Super. 
Ct. S.D. County). 
California Supreme Court denies Harris' 
eighth state petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. No. S013598 (Cal.). 
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United States District Court Judge William B. 
Enright denies Harris' third federal petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. Harris alleges that 
defense psychiatrists did not competently an-
alyze his mental state. No. 90-380-E (S.D. 
Cal.) 
Ninth Circuit Judge Noonan issues stay of ex-
ecution four days prior to Harris' April 3 
scheduled execution, pending Harris' appeal 
of the denial of his third federal habeas 
corpus petition. Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 
724 (9th Cir. ·1990). No. 90-55402 (9th Cir.). 
(Judges Alarcon and Brunetti did not partici-
pate in the decision to grant the stay of execu-
tion.3 ) 
United States Supreme Court (on a vote of 6-
3) denies application of Attorney General to 
vacate Noonan's stay of execution. Vasquez v. 
Harris, 494 U.S. 1064 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). No. A-683 (U.S.). 
Ninth Circuit Judges Alarcon and Brunetti af-
firm district court's denial of Harris' third 
federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 
1990) (Noonan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). No. 90-55402 (9th Cir.). 
Ninth Circuit denies Harris' petition for re-
hearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc 
(relating to their 8/29/90 decision), and 
amends opinion 913 F.2d 606. No. 90-55402 
(9th Cir.). 
Ninth Circuit Judges Alarcon and Brunettire-
mand to district court for Evidentiary Hearing 
on Government Agent Claim and Abuse of 
Writ. Harris v. Vasquez, 928 F.2d 891 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (Noonan, J., dissenting). No. 90-
55402 (9th Cir.). . 
3. See Ninth Circuit Gen. Order 6.3(e) ("Any member of the [motions] panel may 
enter an order granting [an] application" for a stay of execution). 
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United States District Court Judge William 
Enright issues Memorandum Decision after 
evidentiary hearing following remand order. 
No. 90-380-E (S.D. Cal.) 
Ninth Circuit issues second amendment to 
their 8/29/90 decision and supersedes 913 F.2d 
606. Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 
1990) (Noonan, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). No. 90-55402 (9th Cir.). 
Ninth Circuit denies Harris' petition for re-
hearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc 
(relating to their 8/21/91 decision), and cor-
rects opinion 943 F.2d 930. (9th Circuit judges 
voted 13 to 13. Under court rules, a tie vote is 
a loss for Harris.) Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 
1497 (9th Cir. 1990) (Noonan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). No. 90-55402 
(9th Cir.).4 
Ninth Circuit grants 60-day stay of mandate 
pending Harris' application for a writ of cer-
tiorari before the United States Supreme 
Court. No. 90-55402 (9th Cir.). 
United States Supreme Court denies Attorney 
General's application to vacate stay of man-
date. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 633 (1991). 
No. A-372 (U.S.). 
United States Supreme Court denies certiorari 
with regard to Harris' third federal petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. Harris v. Vasquez, 
112 S. Ct. 1275 (1992). No. 91-6990 (U.S.). 
San Diego Superior Court Judge Frederic L. 
Link orders Harris executed on April 21, 1992. 
No. CR 44135 (Super. Ct. S.D. County). 
4. The Ninth Circuit could have ended their review after dismissing each claim of 
Harris' third petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Instead, they reviewed "the merits 
of each of Harris' claims that can be reviewed on habeas corpus, with the hope that all 
questions concerning the validity of the state court's judgment will finally be resolved 
after eleven years of writs and appeals." Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497,1516 (9th Cir. 
1990) (emphasis added). 
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Governor Pete Wilson denies Harris' clemency 
petition. 
Harris files ninth state petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. No. S026177 (Cal.). 
Harris' attorneys file a civil rights class action 
in United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California and request a ten-
day restraining order prohibiting use of lethal 
gas. Fierro v. Gomez. No. 92-1489-MHP (N.D. 
Cal.). 
California Supreme Court denies Harris' ninth 
state habeas. 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1830 (Cal. 
1992). No. CR S026177 (Cal.). 
Harris files fourth federal petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in United States District Court 
for the Southern District of California. No. 92-
0588-T (S.D. Cal.). 
United States District Judge Howard Turren-
tine denies fourth federal habeas petition. No. 
92-0588-T (S.D. Cal.). 
Harris files application to recall the mandate 
in the third federal habeas petition in the 
Ninth Circuit. No. 90-55402 (9th Cir.). . 
United States District Judge Marilyn Hall 
Patel issues a ten-day temporary restraining 
order prohibiting the use of lethal gas. Fierro 
v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
No. 92-1482-MHP (N.D. Cal.). 
Attorney General files application for a writ of 
mandamus in the Ninth Circuit to overturn 
the temporary restraining order. No. 92-70237 
(9th Cir.). 
Harris files a request for stay of execution and 
application for certificate of probable cause in 
Ninth Circuit to appeal denial of fourth fed-
eral habeas. No. 92-55426 (9th Cir.). 
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Ninth Circuit panel denies Harris' application 
to recall mandate in third federal habeas. 
Harris v. Vasquez, 961 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 
1992) (Noonan, J., dissenting). No. 92-55402 
(9th Cir.). 
Ninth Circuit unanimously denies Harris' ap-
plication for stay of execution and certificate 
of probable cause in fourth federal habeas. 
Harris v. Vasquez, 961 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 
1992). No. 92-55426 (9th Cir.). 
Ninth Circuit panel (by a vote of 2-1) grants 
Attorney General's petition for a writ of man-
damus on lethal gas case and vacates the tem-
porary restraining order, opinions to follow. 
Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 790 F. 
Supp. 972 (9th Cir. 1992). No. 92-70237 (9th 
Cir.). 
A single Ninth Circuit judgeli issues the first 
order staying Harris' execution for 10 days 
under Ninth Circuit Rule 22-5 (first stay). No. 
92-55426 (9th Cir.). 
Ten Ninth Circuit judges issue order staying 
execution in lethal gas case (second stay). No. 
92-70237 (9th Cir.). 
United States Supreme Court vacates first 
stay. Harris v. Vasquez, 112 S. Ct. 1713 
(1992). No. A-766 (U.S.). 
Harris files fifth federal petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California. No: 
92-1504-RMW (N.D. Cal.). 
A single Ninth Circuit judge6 issues third stay 
of execution under Ninth Circuit Rule 22-5. 
No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.). 
5. Judge John Noonan, Jr., according to Howard Mintz and Richard Barbieri, Will 
Ninth Circuit Fall in Line?, THE RECORDER, April 22, 1992, at 1. Mintz and Barbieri 
reported that a spokeswoman for the American Civil Liberties Union said the judge was 
John Noonan Jr., but that Judge Noonan could not be reached for comment. Id. 
6. Judge William Norris, according to one newspaper account. See Richard C. Pad-
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 211 
United States District Court Judge Ron 
Whyte dismisses fifth federal habeas petition 
and transfers case to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia. No. 92-1504-RMW (N.D. Cal.); No. 92-
615-T (S.D. Cal.). 
Harris' attorneys withdraw the fifth federal 
habeas petition. No. 92-615-T (S.D. Cal.). 
United States Supreme Court, voting 7-2, va-
cates second and third stays. Gomez v. United 
States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992) (per 
curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting). No. A-767 
(U.S.). 
Harris asks the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California and the 
Ninth Circuit to consider his Section 1983 ac-
tion to be a sixth federal habeas petition and 
to grant a stay of execution to exhaust state 
remedies. No. C-92-1482-MHP (N.D. Cal.); 
No. 92-70237 (9th Cir.). 
A single Ninth Circuit judge (Judge Harry 
Pregerson) telephones San Quentin to issue 
fourth stay. Harris has already been sealed in 
the gas chamber. Harris is unstrapped from 
the chair and removed from the chamber. 
Written order of Ninth Circuit Judge Preger-
son is received. It grants a one-day stay on a 
federal habeas petition. No. 92-70237 (9th 
Cir.). 
Harris files tenth state petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in California Supreme Court. 
No. S026235 (Cal.). 
United States Supreme Court vacates fourth 
stay and orders no further stays "except upon 
order of this court." Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. 
Ct. 1713 (1992). No. A-768 (U.S.) 
dock and Henry Weinstein, Appeal Judges Maneuvered Amid Chaos, LA TIMES, April 
22, 1992, at AI. 
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California Supreme Court denies Harris' tenth 
state petition for writ of habeas corpus. No. 
S026235 (Cal.). 
Harris returns to the gas chamber. 
Harris is pronounced dead. 
The same three-judge Ninth Circuit panel 
which overruled Patel's order temporarily bar-
ring Harris' execution, recalls and vacates writ 
of mandamus as moot and withdraws its opin-
ion filed on April 20, 1992, thereby removing a 
cloud over her jurisdiction in the case. Gomez 
v. United States Dist. Court, 966 F.2d 463 
(9th Cir. 1992). No. 92-70237 (9th 'Cir.). 
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